The Continuous Importance of the Swiss Case for Europeanization Research

Abstract

Switzerland used to be an important case for comparative Europeanization studies. Similar to many European Union (EU) countries but a non-member, the country became a fruitful control case for isolating the causal effects of the European Union. This contribution will argue that the potential for using the country in this way is decreasing. Yet, Switzerland continues to be important for comparative purposes given its institutional possibility and widespread practice of popular referenda. At a time when in many member states the permissive consensus concerning the EU has made place for politicization and declining levels of trust in the EU and its institutions, this institutionalized link between citizens and EU-related policies should draw more scholarly attention. Switzerland is a rich liberal democracy in the heart of Europe. At the same time, the country is not a member of the EU. Through a number of systematically crafted and empirically rich cross-national studies, Swiss scholars have carefully exploited the opportunities that Switzerland's non-membership provides for isolating the causal effect of the EU. The awareness of the advantages of control cases has also spilled over to the study of policy sectors within Switzerland, varying the level of potential EU impact across policy/sectors (see references in the introduction to this Debate). The contributions by Fischer and Sciarini, and by Afonso, Fontana and Papadopoulos speak most directly to this branch of Swiss scholarship. Fischer and Sciarini present results of a research project in which they varied on the independent variable – EU involvement – by comparing the “sectors” free movement of persons (direct Europeanization), telecommunication reform (indirect Europeanization), and pension reform (control case). Afonso and his collaborators combine cross-sector with cross-national comparisons, adding Austria, Belgium and Ireland. The explanatory power of these studies is at least partly related to the scholars' intimate knowledge of Switzerland and its relationship to the EU. Such intimate knowledge is necessary. The contributions to this Debate have once again made clear that scholars need to be extremely careful when characterizing Switzerland as a “non-member”. In fact, “customized quasi-membership” might be a more adequate term (Gava, Sciarini and Varone, referring to Kriesi and Trechsel). To be sure, it is widely known that Switzerland has concluded a series of bilateral sectoral treaties with the EU. According to the data presented by Jenni, almost 10 per cent of Swiss federal legislation in the period 1990-2010 is the result of these treaties. The data also show, that about 85 per cent of this legislation amounts to full adaptation or, in other words, is completely congruent with the relevant acquis communautaire. Hence, in these cases, the source of the EU effect is similar to the one of the member states. Switzerland is not a control case in that respect. In addition, however, it is striking to what extent other legislative processes are also impacted by the EU. Law production is prone to strong indirect Europeanization. Outside the bilateral treaties, Switzerland autonomously adapts to EU law (“autonomer Nachvollzug”) and since 1988, bills sent to the Parliament need to discuss the compatibility of new legislation with the EU acquis, although, of course, the piece of legislation is allowed to be incompatible with EU law (Gava, Sciarini and Varone, this issue, see also Gava and Varone, this issue). In the above-mentioned period, the body of legislation that autonomously adapts to EU law makes up more than 20 per cent of Swiss legislation. To be sure, data by Jenni show that most of this legislation does not fully adapt to the acquis, but rather “partially adapts” or is merely “compatible”. But still, scholars need to be careful not to take these pieces of legislation as control cases: as cases that are a priori are not influenced by the EU. This large EU-related legislative footprint should not only affect Swiss policies, but should also affect Swiss political processes and the Swiss polity. This implies that these elements of the political system might also become less suitable as control cases. Moreover, these pieces of legislation might also be the source of indirect mechanisms of Europeanization such as framing domestic beliefs, policy learning, or changing domestic opportunity structures (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). For example, a government department assessing the compatibility of a proposed law with the acquis communautaire might learn about EU policy concepts and practices that the department might use for other pieces of legislation, or that might enter the domestic discourse and indirectly shape further policies. Compared to the direct Europeanization mechanism “institutional compliance”, the potential of taking Switzerland as a control case for indirect mechanisms was always more limited. Given the similarities with EU countries, horizontal indirect mechanisms such a diffusion or learning might have been at work even in the absence of EU-related legislation (Haverland 2006). The large legislative footprint limits this potential further. The discussion above points to the decreasing potential of utilizing the non-membership of Switzerland for comparative purposes. At the same time, the “quasi-member” Switzerland offers fresh and innovative avenues for future comparative research: in particular the fact that all federal legislation, hence also all federal legislation that directly or indirectly adapts to the EU, is subject to an optional referendum. As Afonso, Fontana and Papadopoulos state almost in passing: “Direct democracy created a ‘constraining dissensus’ (…) right from the start”. To some extent other member states “catch up” when it comes to politicization. Many member states face increased media attention for EU issues, a rising salience of the EU in domestic party competition, and the emergence of Eurosceptic parties (Hooghe and Marks 2009). This might not only affect European integration at large, but also for instance the implementation of EU legislation (Haverland 2013). At the same time, the option of popular referenda is lacking in the member states, at least below the level of constitutional changes. This should make Switzerland a fascinating contrast case for comparative studies. How does the presence/absence of referenda shape party politics and interest groups politics when it comes to EU-related policy processes? Who is empowered and who is weakened? The contribution by Afonso et al. cites the case of trade unions that seek to protect Swiss wages against downward pressures that might be generated by the bilateral treaty on the free movement of workers. Trade unions threatened government to back a referendum against free movement and extracted more labor market regulation. Reading this contribution and the one by Fischer and Sciarini, it seems that trade unions fare relatively well and are taken seriously by government, perhaps more seriously than in many member states, shape the response of governments, political parties and interest groups to EU pressures, and how this translates into power relations and policy outputs. Comparing Switzerland with EU member states that lack referenda helps to isolate the “referendum effect” and might also provide useful lessons for countries where a greater use of referenda is part of the normative debate about democratic reform. Markus Haverland is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and Fellow at the Montesquieu Institute in The Hague. His interests include the politics of EU policy making, the effect of the EU on member states, comparative public policy and the methodology and methods of causal case studies. He has published on these themes in journals such as the Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Social Policy, Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of Public Policy, Public Administration, Public Administration Review and West European Politics. Together with Joachim Blatter, he has published Designing Case Studies. Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research (2012). Address for correspondence: Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Social Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Phone: + 31 (0)10 408 2055; E-mail: [email protected]