The sociological critique of evolutionary psychology: Beyond mass modularity

Abstract

This paper addresses evolutionary psychology's (EP's) mass modularity account of human intelligence. First, EP is located within 'naturalization of society' discourses. Secondly, the nature and weakness of mass modularity theory is examined. In the third part of the paper, the genetic reductionism of EP is challenged with reference to developmental systems theory (DST). However, in the fourth part, the danger of importing one biological theory to defuse the colonial ambitions of another is highlighted through an examination of sociological systems theory and its relationship with biological systems theory. Nevertheless, DST has stimulated valuable insights in theoretical sociology/anthropology. Modularity is also common in computer models of intelligence as algorithmic computation. EP draws parallels with computer modelling to claim confirmation of its own account. The fifth part of this article challenges the validity of this parallel, drawing upon Harry Collins's sociology of what humans and computers can do. Collins's work highlights the non-modular cultural 'rules' that today's computers cannot follow. In the light of these theoretical and empirical developments I conclude that contemporary sociology offers a valuable and systematic counter to discourses of genetic reductionism and the discourses of technological determination upon which they are parasitic.