The Social Philosophy of Jane Addams. Maurice Hamington

Abstract

Reviewed by: The Social Philosophy of Jane Addams James Campbell Maurice Hamington. The Social Philosophy of Jane Addams. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009, x + 228 pp. This welcome volume offers a rich presentation of the ideas of Jane Addams (1860–1935), with emphases upon her contributions to the Pragmatic movement. It is divided into two parts. Chapters 1–4 “provide a historical and theoretical foundation for Addams’s social philosophy,” and chapters 5–9 “discuss how Addams applied her social theories to a variety of social issues” (p. 11) including pacifism, race and diversity, socialism, education broadly conceived, and religion. There is also an introduction, an afterword, and an extensive bibliography. It is the author’s hope that his study will spur further work on the role of Addams, and other women, in the history of Pragmatism and American philosophy; and I anticipate that it will. Hamington begins with a very brief sketch of Addams’s life that includes her education at Rockford Female Seminary and her brief period of medical study. What followed was a William James-like period of depression and neurasthenia that was ‘cured,’ as was James’s, with the adoption of a career. In late 1889, she and Ellen Gates Starr (1859–1940) opened Hull House; and that institution and Addams have been synonymous ever since. Under her guidance, Hull House became an oasis of aesthetic, medical, educational, musical, athletic, social, and civic endeavors in a densely-populated and poverty-stricken neighborhood in Chicago. It was also, as Hamington points out, deliberately [End Page 352] organized as “a woman’s space” (p. 26). Hull House played an important role in the development of the University of Chicago (opened 1892), the broadening of Chicago Pragmatism, and the life of its neighborhood. Some familiar themes, like Quakerism, are missing from this study; others, like lesbianism, are more prominent. Hamington’s presentation demonstrates a very high level of enthusiasm for Addams and her work; his strongest criticism seems to be that she was “not beyond reproach when it came to matters of race” (p. 110). Given the aim of this volume to reposition Addams within the history of American philosophy, it is important to consider what the term ‘philosophy’ meant and means. Despite our preference for simple definitions and histories, ‘the love for wisdom’ has evolved over the centuries and continues to evolve. Of particular importance in the material that Hamington is examining is the question of the relationship between ‘philosophy’ and ‘pragmatism.’ Although he describes pragmatism at one point as “a main branch of American philosophy” (p. 1), Hamington apparently considers the terms virtually equivalent, and uses them almost interchangeably. Traditionally, the terms have denoted two only-partially overlapping areas of endeavor. Thus it was possible to be a philosopher without being a pragmatist, and a pragmatist without being a philosopher. A clear example of the former would be Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930); of the latter, Jane Addams. In America at the birth of the twentieth century, the term ‘philosopher’ was coming to mean a member of a professional class of college-or university-connected intellectuals who earned special degrees, taught special classes, joined special societies, wrote special books, and published articles in special journals.1 One of the sad results of this process of philosophical professionalization was the isolation of its practitioners. In any case, this is the settled meaning of ‘philosopher’ that we have inherited. It is clear that Addams did not want to be such a ‘philosopher.’ (Surely, she could have earned a philosophy Ph.D. and pursued an academic career.) Addams, it seems, believed that she had more important work to do than ‘philosophy’: she wanted to mitigate the suffering of humankind. Hamington clearly understands all of this — he indicates his recognition of “professional women philosophers” in Addams’s day (p. 92), and admits that ‘philosopher’ was not “a title she claimed for herself” (p. 6)—but he wishes to re-think the term to allow her access. He has a valorized notion of being a ‘philosopher’ that would take the job beyond journals and department business and committee work, and reconnect it with the love of wisdom. He thus offers us...