The social contract for science and the value-free ideal

Abstract

While the Value-Free Ideal (VFI) had many precursors, it became a solidified bulwark of normative claims about scientific reasoning and practice in the mid-twentieth century. Since then, it has played a central role in the philosophy of science, first as a basic presupposition of how science should work, then as a target for critique, and now as a target for replacement. In this paper, we will argue that a narrow focus on the VFI is misguided, because the VFI coalesced in the midst of other important shifts in the relationship between science and society. In particular, the mid-twentieth century saw the acceptance of the “social contract for science,” a tacit agreement between scientists and government officials, and more broadly between science and society. It was built around three core concepts: a distinction between basic and applied science, a conception of scientific freedom that limited social responsibility for scientists, and a justification for public funding of basic science in the form of the linear model. Within the conceptual framework of the social contract for science, it is clearer both (1) why the VFI was adopted, (2) why it is difficult to replace the VFI within the old social contract, and (3) how we need to revise the social contract for science in order to replace the VFI.