Abstract

HBOS plc, a UK-based financial institution, initially appeared as a remarkable success story in the banking industry. 2001 marked a pivotal moment when Halifax and Bank of Scotland joined forces to create HBOS. For the subsequent six years, it achieved substantial double-digit profits, solidifying its position. In 2007, the bank’s market capitalization soared to an impressive £40 billion. While HBOS garnered accolades from analysts and brokers for its apparent success, beneath the surface, its business model proved susceptible to economic fluctuations due to what was identified as a flawed strategy and inadequate risk management practices. These critical shortcomings left the bank ill-prepared to navigate the global financial crisis. In October 2008, HBOS faced a severe crisis and ultimately merged with Lloyds Banking Group. This case delves into the intricacies of HBOS’s strategy, internal and external governance issues and the changing business environment. It serves as an invaluable tool for students seeking to comprehend the factors that led to the company’s downfall. Several pressing questions are raised, including the role of accounting improprieties, the effectiveness of the risk management system, internal governance and the inability of the board and auditors to foresee the impending challenges within the company.

Full Text
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