Abstract
Abstract We quantify the cost of pledging collateral for small businesses by exploiting a regulatory quirk of the SBA disaster lending program in which firms are exempt from posting collateral if their loan size is below a threshold. Firms bunch their loans below the threshold, and the resulting distortion in the loan size distribution reveals the magnitude of the collateral cost. The collateral cost is substantial and varies across collateral types, business sectors, and collateral laws in ways consistent with flexibility-based theories. Our findings have implications for firms’ borrowing constraints and disaster lending program designs. (JEL E44, E51, G21, G23, G33)
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