The Sergo Zakariadze Response and Refloating: Timelines are not Concrete

Abstract

ABSTRACT On November 18, 1999, the 605-foot Russian-flagged motor vessel Sergo Zakariadze lost steering while returning to the Port of San Juan, Puerto Rico after the passage of Hurricane Lenny. The pilot and vessel's crew attempted to engage various alternate and emergency steering systems to regain control without success. The vessel's engine engaged full astern too late, and the Sergo Zakariadze grounded with over 200,000 gallons of oil and over 17,000 tons of cement dust aboard. The vessel grounded at the base of the historic 500-year-old Castle El Morro, just 50 yards outside San Juan's economically vital Bar Channel. A Unified Command (UC) was established with the following overall incident objectives: safety of people (responders, crew, public); removal of oil/fuel from the vessel; protection of cultural, archeological, and environmental resources including underwater resources; protection of the San Juan Bar Channel; and removal of the vessel from its El Morro location. A three-phased response was mounted: (1) removal of oil products onboard the vessel, (2) removal of cargo necessary to refloat the vessel, and (3) refloating of the vessel. Encountering and overcoming a myriad of logistical, environmental response, weather, and operational challenges, the Sergo Zakariadze was refloated successfully on March 29, 2000. The response included oil lightering, cement dust offload, set-up cement removal, and vessel salvage operations. Although the response spanned 4 months, it was viewed as very successful from community, media, and stakeholder perspectives. This success was due to the UC being composed of a broad cross section of stakeholders, an aggressive outreach effort, an active listening program, and recognition of actual and potential community perceived hazards associated with the response operation. This paper will describe some of the issues and challenges that the UC addressed and some of the lessons that were learned. This paper will not recount the details of all facets of the actual response and salvage operations.