The search for the neural correlate of consciousness: Progress and challenges

The neurogenetic correlates of consciousness (NgCC) is a new field of consciousness studies that focuses on genes that have an effect on or are involved in the continuum of neuron-based consciousness. A framework of consciousness based on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) has already been established by Francis Crick and Christof Kock. In this work I propose that there are NgCC underlying the NCC which are both active during the conscious experience. So how are genes involved? There are two significant connections between DNA and neurons that are involved in the conscious experience. First, any brain system can be adversely affected by underlying genetic abnormalities which can be expressed in an individual at birth, in adulthood, or later in life. Second, the DNA molecule does not lay dormant while the neuron runs on autopilot. DNA is active in translating and transcribing RNA and protein products that are utilized during neuron functioning. Without these products being continuously produced by the DNA during a conscious experience the neurons would cease to function correctly and be rendered unable to provide a continuum of human consciousness. Consequently, in addition to NCC, NgCC must be factored in when appreciating a conscious event. In this work I will discuss and explain some NgCC citing several examples.

Multiple Perspectives on Consciousness for Cognitive Science Richard A. Carlson (racarlson@psu.edu) Department of Psychology, Penn State University 613 Moore Building, University Park, PA 16802 USA The huge contemporary literature on consciousness spans multiple disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience. This tutorial will introduce participants to major proposals about consciousness, and their empirical and methodological implications. The goal is to prepare participants to explore the consciousness literature in greater depth. Our consideration of perspectives on consciousness will be organized by considering how these perspectives address core questions about consciousness, including: (a) How can subjectivity and agency be accommodated in a scientific theory of consciousness? (b) How can conscious and nonconscious or unconscious processes and representations be systematically distinguished? (c) How can conscious mental states be assessed or measured? (d) How can dissociations and impairments of consciousness be understood? The literatures to be considered address these questions in analytic, functional, computational, and implementational terms. Philosophical Perspectives Philosophers approach the problem of consciousness from a variety of analytic perspectives, some focusing on contemporary formulations of the mind-body problem and others on analyses of subjective experience. Among the philosophical perspectives we will consider are John Searle’s (1992) analysis of consciousness in terms of intentionality, David Chalmer’s (1996) distinction between “easy” and “hard” problems of consciousness, David Rosenthal’s (1993) “higher order thought” proposal, and Daniel Dennett’s (1991) “multiple drafts” theory of consciousness. Neuroscience Perspectives Neuroscientists have made a wide variety of proposals concerning the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). A starting assumption is that a subset of current neural activity is correlated with current conscious experience. There is controversy, however, concerning how that subset is to be identified. For example, the NCC might be limited to particular types of cells or anatomical structures, or comprise global patterns of synchronized neural activity. We will consider recent proposals concerning NCC by Crick and Koch (1998), Damasio (2000), and Edelman and Tononi Psychological Perspectives Psychological perspectives on consciousness generally focus on functionally-defined aspects of cognition. For example, psychologists have identified consciousness with working memory (Baars, 1988), attention (Schneider & Pimm-Smith, 1997), metacognition (Nelson, 1996), and with the structure of mental states (Carlson, 1997). Cognitive research often focuses on distinguishing conscious and nonconscious influences on psychological processes such as learning (Dienes & Berry, 1997) and perception (Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001). This research has generated a rich literature on methods for assessing consciousness. References Baars, B. J. (1988). A cognitive theory of consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press. Carlson, R. A. (1997). Experienced Cognition. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1998). Consciousness and neuroscience. Cerebral Cortex, 8, 97-107. Damasio, A. R. (2000). A neurobiology for consciousness. In T. Metzinger (Ed.), Neural correlates of consciousness Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Dienes, Z., & Berry, D. (1997). Implicit learning: Below the subjective threshold. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 4, Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Edelman, G. M., & Tononi, G. (2000). Reentry and the dynamic core: Neural correlates of conscious experience. In T. Metzinger (Ed.), Neural correlates of consciousness. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Merikle, P. M., Smilek, D., & Eastwood, J. D. (2001). Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology. Cognition, 79, 115-134. Nelson, T. O. (1996). Consciousness and metacognition. American Psychologist, 51, 102-116. Rosenthal, D. M. (1993). Thinking that one thinks. In M. Davies, & G. W. Humphreys (Eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and philosophical essays. Oxford: Blackwell. Searle, J. R. (1992). The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Schneider, W., & Pimm-Smith, M. (1997). Consciousness as a message aware control mechanism to modulate cognitive processing. J. Cohen, & J. Schooler (Eds.), Scientific approaches to consciousness: The 25th Carnegie Symposium on Cognition. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

It has been shown that three-dimensional self-assembled multicellular structures derived from human pluripotent stem cells show electrical activity similar to EEG. More recently, neurons were successfully embedded in digital game worlds. The biologically inspired neural network (BNN), expressing human cortical cells, was able to show internal modification and learn the task at hand (predicting the trajectory of a digital ball while moving a digital paddle). In other words, the system allowed to read motor information and write sensory data into cell cultures. In this article, we discuss Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) theories, and their capacity to predict or even allow for consciousness in a BNN. We found that Information Integration Theory (IIT) is the only NCC that offers the possibility for a BNN to show consciousness, since the Φ value in the BNN is >0. In other words, the recording of real-time neural activity responding to environmental stimuli. IIT argues that any system capable of integrating information will have some degree of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that the pattern of activity appearing in the BNN, with increased density of sensory information leading to better performance, implies that the BNN could be conscious. This may have profound implications from a psychological, philosophical, and ethical perspective.

Adult Daughters? Perceptions of the Mother-Daughter Relationship: A Cross-Cultural Comparison* This study compares the perception of adult daughter-s' relationship with their mothers across the European American, Asian Indian American, and Mexican American cultures, using intergenerational, feminist object relations and attachment theories. Three dimensions were used to measure the relationships: closeness, reliability, and collectivism. Each dimension was measured using two instruments: the AAS and the MAD. The latter was developed to be sensitive to cultural differences and includes a new variable called trust in hierarchy. This variable represents positive beliefs about, and an acceptance of hierarchy in intergenerational relationships. The participants were 91 women from the three ethnic groups. Cross-cultural differences in the adult daughtermother relationship were found, with the Asian Indian American group scoring higher than the European American group on many variables. Scores for the Mexican American group tended to fall between those of the other two groups. Key Words: attachment, cross-cultural, gender intergenerational, mother-daughter The mother-daughter relationship is highly significant in many cultures. The purpose of this study was to examine the mother-adult daughter relationship across the European American, Mexican American, and Asian Indian American cultures. This study is significant because: (a) no cross-cultural research on mother-daughter relationships exists in the literature and, (b) certain variables used in the study (connectedness, interdependence, and trust in hierarchy) have not been measured in previous studies on family relationships. The three ethnic groups were compared on three key dimensions derived from intergenerational family therapy, feminist object relations, and attachment theories. These dimensions of relationships (closeness, reliability, and collectivism) were each measured in two different ways using both an existing and a new measure. These six variables included connectedness and closeness (under the closeness dimension), interdependence and dependency (under the dimension of reliability), and differentiation and trust in hierarchy (under the dimension of collectivism.). Family professionals utilize theories, techniques and other empirically derived generalizations in their work. However, rarely do we know if the relationships between variables that hold true for a certain group of people in the United States (e.g., European American women) are universally generalizable. Without testing them across various cultural groups (e.g., Mexican American and Asian Indian American women), the explanatory power of theories and other generalizations is severely restricted and runs the risk of being ethnocentric. In utilizing the norms developed in one context to measure the behavior in another culture we may draw erroneous conclusions if the two cultures are dissimilar (Straus, 1969). Thus, comparative research helps shape our theories and tests the generalizability of knowledge derived from hypotheses tested in one context to other dissimilar contexts (Lee & Haas, 1993). Methodological Challenges This preliminary cross-cultural investigation into motherdaughter relationships came with its own methodological challenges having to do with validity. These concerns are divided into: (a) instrumentation, and (b) sampling. Instrumentation. To ensure conceptual equivalence (Straus, 1969) of the constructs across the three cultures certain precautions were used. First, a new, culturally sensitive measure called the Mother-Adult Daughter (MAD) questionnaire was developed. This allowed the researchers to measure the three key dimensions using culturally relevant items. These items were developed using theory, cross-cultural literature, and feedback from a pilot study and increased content validity of the measure. The first two dimensions, closeness and reliability, (also see Collins & Read, 1990) were first measured using the MAD. …

Despite the fact that blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have become ubiquitous and are of ever increasing importance for clinical and basic neurosciences, the fundamental relationships between BOLD and the underlying neuronal physiology are not understood. This raises severe concerns about the validity of BOLD contrast per se, and the conceptual frameworks currently employed in interpreting cognitive neuroimaging data. In order to expand the explanatory power of functional MRI data, several crucial questions will have to be addressed. The two most important questions are: First, what is the ultimate spatial resolution of fMRI?, secondly, what is the "neural correlate" of functional MRI? This article attempts to compile a series of results from our and other laboratories, suggesting that both the questions of "spatial specificity" and "neural correlate" might be within the reach of a tentative solution, thus finally bridging the gap between functional neuroimaging and neuronal physiology.

EDITORIAL article Front. Hum. Neurosci., 01 February 2013Sec. Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 7 - 2013 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00022

ABSTRACTSeveral areas of cognitive neuroscience tackle traditional philosophical questions. Among the range of problems, two closely related issues will be addressed in more detail from both neurobiological and philosophical perspectives: the relationship between mind and matter and the nature of perception. Neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies are reviewed that examine the connection between neuronal processes and consciousness. The most prominent theories on the neuronal correlates of consciousness (NCC) are then compared with philosophical attempts to address the epistemic gap between the material processes in the brain and mental phenomena. Before exploring whether neurobiological discoveries can help resolve philosophical problems, the epistemic challenges are discussed, stemming from the fact that perceptions are shaped by the brain's functional architecture. It is suggested that the ‘hard problem of consciousness’—the challenge of explaining how the qualia of subjective experience can arise from neuronal processes—can be alleviated if two conditions are met: first, that perception depends on priors and, second, that some of these priors are formed through interactions with the immaterial realities of cultural concepts. Although this approach offers a coherent naturalistic explanation for the emergence of mental phenomena, it does not resolve the cognitive dissonance between our intuitions and scientific evidence regarding the relationship between matter and mind.

The study of tinnitus has become of great interest due to the increasing number and severity of cases reported worldwide. To cope with such situation, many experimental and theoretical studies have been dedicated to gain deeper insight into the neurophysiological mechanisms involved in the tinnitus decompensation. In this direction, some of the most influential tinnitus models have emphasized the link between selective attention and the tinnitus decompensation. However, it is still not clear what are the mechanisms involved in such relation and wether it is possible to provide a neuropsychological framework linking them with respect to large-scale neural correlates. In order to address such issues, we make use of evoked cortical potential neural correlates of auditory selective attention. We thus propose an integrative multiscale modeling approach for large-scale neural correlates of selective attention in the tinnitus decompensation. The results of our simulations are compared with experimental data so that hypothesis can be validated.

Communicative pointing is a human specific gesture which allows sharing information about a visual item with another person. It sets up a three-way relationship between a subject who points, an addressee and an object. Yet psychophysical and neuroimaging studies have focused on non-communicative pointing, which implies a two-way relationship between a subject and an object without the involvement of an addressee, and makes such gesture comparable to touching or grasping. Thus, experimental data on the communicating function of pointing remain scarce. Here, we examine whether the communicative value of pointing modifies both its behavioral and neural correlates by comparing pointing with or without communication. We found that when healthy participants pointed repeatedly at the same object, the communicative interaction with an addressee induced a spatial reshaping of both the pointing trajectories and the endpoint variability. Our finding supports the hypothesis that a change in reference frame occurs when pointing conveys a communicative intention. In addition, measurement of regional cerebral blood flow using H2O15 PET-scan showed that pointing when communicating with an addressee activated the right posterior superior temporal sulcus and the right medial prefrontal cortex, in contrast to pointing without communication. Such a right hemisphere network suggests that the communicative value of pointing is related to processes involved in taking another person's perspective. This study brings to light the need for future studies on communicative pointing and its neural correlates by unraveling the three-way relationship between subject, object and an addressee.

OPINION article Front. Hum. Neurosci., 09 December 2011Sec. Cognitive Neuroscience volume 5 - 2011 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2011.00162

Traumatic stress can have severe consequences for both mental and physical health. Furthermore, both psychological and biological traces of trauma increase as a function of accumulating traumatic experiences. Neurobiological research may aid in limiting the impact of traumatic stress, by leading to advances in preventive and treatment interventions. To promote the possibility for clinical implementation of novel research findings, this brief review describes timely conceptual and methodological challenges and directions in neurobiological trauma research on behalf of the Task Force “Neurobiology of Traumatic Stress” of the European Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (ESTSS). The most important conceptual challenges are the heterogeneity of disorders and existence of subtypes across diagnostic categories: differential latent profiles and trajectories regarding symptom expression and neural correlates are being unraveled; however, similar latent classes’ approaches for treatment response and neurobiological data remain scarce thus far. The key to improving the efficacy of currently available preventive interventions and treatments for trauma-related disorders lies in a better understanding and characterization of individual differences in response to trauma and interventions. This could lead to personalized treatment strategies for trauma-related disorders, based on objective information indicating whether individuals are expected to benefit from them. The most important methodological challenge identified here is the need for large consortia and meta-analyses or, rather, mega-analyses on existent data as a first step. In addition, large multicenter studies, combining novel methods for repeated sampling with more advanced statistical modeling techniques, such as machine learning, should aim to translate identified disease mechanisms into molecular blood-based biomarker combinations to predict disorder vulnerability and treatment responses.

Scientific, objective approach to consciousness has allowed to obtain some experimental data concerning brain activity, ignoring, however, the longstanding philosophical tradition. Spectacular development of neuroscience which has been observed recently made this dissonance particularly noticeable. The paper addresses the main problems of discrepancy between neurobiological research and philosophical perspective. Current opinions concerning neural correlates and models of consciousness are discussed, as well as the problems of working memory, attention, self, and disorders of consciousness. A new neurobiological approach to describe brain function in terms of brain connectivity (so-called connectome) is also presented. Finally, the need to introduce at least some aspects of philosophical approach directly into neurobiological research of consciousness is postulated.

Islamic economics is fundamentally rooted in divine principles, shaping an economic system that originates from God, is directed towards God, and operates within the framework of Sharia law. Unlike conventional economic systems, which often prioritise materialism and individualism, Islamic economics integrates moral and ethical values, ensuring economic justice and social welfare. The system is built upon two key arguments: first, a theological foundation that emphasises divine guidance in economic activities, and second, an empirical and philosophical perspective that addresses real-world economic challenges. This study examines the philosophical underpinnings of Islamic economics, contrasting it with capitalist and socialist ideologies, which often fail to resolve socio-economic inequalities. By incorporating principles of fairness (ʿadl) and balance (tawāzun), Islamic economics provides an alternative framework that prioritises collective well-being. The study further explores the implications of Islamic economic thought on contemporary financial practices, highlighting its relevance in fostering ethical and sustainable economic growth

Self-conscious emotions play a crucial role in social functioning, moral behavior, and identity formation. Their inherent complexity, necessitating self-awareness and social evaluation, presents significant challenges for empirical research. This systematic review identifies methodological issues and gaps in experimental research related to the affective traits (valence and arousal), physiological and neural correlates, nonverbal cues, and cross-cultural variations of self-conscious emotions. A comprehensive search was conducted for peer-reviewed empirical studies published between 2000 and 2024 across databases such as PubMed, PsycINFO, Scopus, and Web of Science, adhering to PRISMA 2020 guidelines. Inclusion criteria focused on studies examining self-conscious emotions through physiological, neurological, behavioral, or cross-cultural approaches. A total of twenty-three studies were included, revealing variability in the valence and arousal profiles of self-conscious emotions, with distinct physiological and neural correlates identified in regions such as the medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and default mode network. Nonverbal cues, including posture, blushing, and gaze aversion, exhibited differences among emotions. Cross-cultural studies highlighted both universal and culturally specific patterns in the elicitation and expression of these emotions. However, limitations such as challenges in experimental induction, ecological validity, and construct operationalization hinder the generalizability and replicability of findings. The predominance of Western-centric studies further restricts cross-cultural applicability. Overall, self-conscious emotions remain underexplored compared to basic emotions, primarily due to methodological and ethical challenges. Future research should prioritize standardized definitions, ecologically valid designs, multimodal measurements, and diverse cultural samples to deepen the understanding of these complex emotions and their implications in clinical, social, and developmental contexts.

In Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged From Chaos, Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam take the reader on a ride through the timeline of life on planet Earth. This kind of voyage has been presented before. Daniel Dennett gave us his Darwinian-inspired volume From Bacteria to Bach and Back in 2017, and, more recently, Joseph LeDoux published The Deep History of Ourselves, a version that focused on the neurocognitive elements (LeDoux, 2019). Ogas and Gaddam's account differs from these others in emphasis and style, though like Dennett and LeDoux they begin at the beginning with the appearance of the first living unicellular species archaea and bacteria, the prokaryotes.I have several problems with the book, and they start with the subtitle. The approach to abiogenesis, or the origins of life, views the process as a measured, gradual transition in which organic molecules assembled into entities with cell membranes and capable of self-reproduction—not “chaotic” but orderly. The first living cells were remarkably fine-tuned organisms with complex biomolecular functions. Even more problematic, from my perspective, is that “thinking” didn't “emerge” at some time in evolution. The cellular basis of consciousness (CBC) model, developed in The First Minds (Reber, 2019), is grounded on the assumption that cognitive functions were there from the very beginnings, that life and sentience (“thinking,” if you wish) are coterminous.1 Cognitive functions are inherent features of all life forms. Every organism is sentient, no matter how basic its biomolecular functions are. Every living cell experiences valenced perceptions, displays a variety of cognitive processes, learns, forms stable memories, and communicates with others. One that did not would have been a Darwinian dead end. It could not have survived in the (real) chaos that was its primal environment.Ogas and Gaddam seem, at first, to accept this framework, as they do discuss many of these features of prokaryote life and, as early as page 3 they tell us that the housefly “marks . . . nature's boundary between minds that are unquestionably non-conscious and those indisputably conscious.” But then in later chapters they dismiss both the prokaryotes and insects as not being truly reflective of consciousness, sentience—that a nervous system is required and consciousness had to await the evolution of vertebrates. The result is that the initial discussions of the great journey are muddled. In the first several chapters, beginning with their overview of archaea and bacteria, they refer to these prokaryotes as being the first “minds.” In fact, they use the term “supermind” when referring to colonies of unicellular species. But later, after a description of prokaryotic learning, memorial functions, perception, guided locomotion, and communication, they state, “This is surely not consciousness, mind you” (p. 54). Well, it's not human consciousness, but I see no reason why Ogas and Gaddam don't consider these manifestly sentient behaviors as examples of consciousness. I see no reason why existential consciousness starts with vertebrates and not with prokaryotes—which they earlier seemed quite comfortable endowing with “minds.” After a time I began to think that the real problem here just might be lexicographical. In their framework it is possible to have species with minds but without consciousness. From the point of view of the CBC, the first unicellular species were sentient; had minds, experiences, and valenced perceptions; felt pain; learned; formed stable memories; and communicated both within and between colonies.Ogas and Gaddam also mischaracterize aspects of the world of the unicellular. For example, they claim that the first cellular colonies were formed by amoebas (protists) and that communication began with slime molds. But bacteria form colonies and communicate both within and between the collectives, even when they are of different species (see discussions in Reber, 2019; Reber & Baluška, 2020). They maintain that “multitasking” didn't appear until multicellular eukaryote species such as Hydra vulgaris, arguing that a species needs distinct parts to multitask. Again, unicellular bacteria multitask routinely. Prokaryotes defend against viruses (using CRISPR) while absorbing nutrients, locomoting, and communicating with others.I worried that, being a cognitive psychologist who came to this area of scholarship late in my career, perhaps I had misunderstood Ogas and Gaddam's presentation. I contacted a respected cell biologist who'd read the book for an expert's analysis. The response fit with my understanding: Their cell biology knowledge and expertise are wanting.Ogas and Gaddam have also assumed a burden, dubbed the “emergentist's dilemma,” though they appear not to realize it. If the species that have true consciousness evolved from ones that were “dumb” biomechanical beings, then the biomechanisms that caused the transition to self-awareness, reflection, a true mind need to be identified. They state that when the neural functions reach a certain (but unspecified) level of complexity and interaction, consciousness is “ignited”—which isn't terribly helpful. They are not alone here, of course. Many others who have charted the same evolutionary course have the same problem. And none of them seem to appreciate it either.2 On the other hand, taking the CBC model and recognizing that sentience and life are coterminous changes the nature of the issue. There is still the need to discover the biomolecular causes here, but the problem is a far more tractable one than trying to unpack what happened with the evolution of vertebrates.I appreciate that, in the field of consciousness studies, the CBC model is the outlier while Ogas and Gaddam's stance reflects the standard paradigm. A number of recent books and articles (e.g., Damasio, 2022; Dennett, 2017; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013; Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019; Godfrey-Smith, 2016) also cover the behaviors of prokaryotes and conclude that, because they lack nervous systems, they are simply displaying what Dennett called “competence without comprehension.” Not surprisingly, there is little agreement among these authors as to when in evolution a genuine consciousness emerged. Some, like Ogas and Gaddam, argue for vertebrates. Both Ginsburg and Jablonka and Feinberg and Mallatt put it at the beginnings of the Cambrian explosion—although for different reasons. Godfrey-Smith maintains the first conscious species were the cephalopods. Others, such as Barron and Klein (2016), have argued for insects. Elsewhere (Reber, 2019; Reber & Baluška, 2020), it was noted that there is an interesting pattern here. Each researcher identifies the appearance of sentience with the species they studied. The reason is, of course, because it was there all along.From this point in the journey, Ogas and Gaddam's focus shifts and the framework becomes a “modular” approach where behaviors are characterized as due to the functions of modules that handle the where, why, when, and how of different circumstances. The presumed existence of these modules is based on the research and theories of neuroscientist Stephen Grossberg. Grossberg is generally regarded as one of the founders of the computational neurosciences and, along with Gail Carpenter, developer of adaptive resonance theory (ART). ART is a feedforward system that strives to simulate various functions from those of individual cells to coordinated, parallel, and interactive cerebral modules. The model is based on neural nets and, using a variety of ART “types” (depending on the task at hand), has been successful in simulating a number of perceptual and cognitive functions. The theory is provocative and influential (in subareas of the field) but hardly Newtonian in scope and impact (and, yes, Ogas and Gaddam liken him to Sir Isaac). I suspect Grossberg is pleased to know that his theory of mind is “the solution to one of the most boggling mysteries in science: how consciousness works and why consciousness exists at all” (p. 131)—but he would, I also suspect, demur on the grandiosity of such a claim.Ogas and Gaddam use Grossberg's modules to describe how various species behave. For example, the chapter on the tortoise mind has a red-toed tortoise looking to eat a snail. Its What module handles the real-time input, matches visual patterns with memories of previously encountered snails, experiences “resonance,” and engages the Where, When, and Why modules, and so on. Unfortunately, there are no data and no empirical support for such a story. It's just a theoretical description based on the presumption that the tortoise mind can be thought of as a cluster of Grossbergian modules. Similar analyses are presented of the behaviors and minds of various species up to and including Homo sapiens.I'm trying my best to be fair, but I do not see how a modular framing of the story of the evolution of mind is an improvement on more conventional analyses. It doesn't advance the field simply because it doesn't bring any additional explanatory power. One could easily provide a very different story by, say, building the description around motivation, genetics, sociality, competition, ecology, mating. It wouldn't result in a simulation by a neural net, but, to put it crudely, so what? Grossberg's quantitative approach to consciousness and cerebral functioning, based as it is on neural nets, lacks several features that are essential in understanding consciousness—of any species. There are no genetic mechanisms—a significant contributor to any species’ functions. Neural nets lack social elements; we, and many other species including bacteria, are compellingly social. There are no embodied components; minds exist, not in vats but in bodies. Even more problematic, the modules have no developmental processes; they change over time with experience and feedback, but those changes aren't based on any biological growth and aging processes. In short, by tethering their approach to Grossberg, Ogas and Gaddam end up with a book that, while engaging at times, and informative at times, simply doesn't bring any new insights to the table.A common rhetorical device is the reference to “superminds,” and the term is used for any species that forms collectives, literally (as in species such as slime molds that aggregate into colonies, birds that form social groups and interact with each other, and humans in social groups) and figuratively (to refer to a presumed collective consciousness that emerges from groups of humans coordinating behaviors). Again, it's not clear what the gain is here, but it does give them a platform for some lovely passages outlining the roles of thought and language and extending the speculation to imagined futures with galaxy-wide consciousness.Ogas and Gaddam write in an engaging style, though they do assign a series of cutesy-pie names to the subjects of the discourse. An archaea is “Archie.” “Sally” is the salmonella bacterium, and a roundworm is dubbed the “Duke of Dirt.” They also jokingly caution us to never let a slime mold hear us call it that. Amusing, I guess, but slime molds are routinely called that in the literature (e.g., Jabr, 2012). “Yuna and Conley” are stand-ins for the Union and the Confederacy; I have no idea what the point of this one was other than the possibility it was presented as an example of a collective supermind having a consciousness that transcended those of the ordinary humans either defending or being repulsed by slavery. I appreciate that Ogas and Gaddam were trying to make complex issues appear simple, but it didn't work. It felt like they were trying to review the rich and complex evidence for the several billion years of evolution for middle-schoolers.The book jacket has positive blurbs from several highly respected scientists, including Karl Friston, Stephen Kosslyn, and Philip Zimbardo. Perhaps they saw things in it that I didn't. My overall assessment is more modest: a bold but flawed effort.