The Russian‐Iranian reactordeal

Abstract

David Albright is President of the Institute for Science and International Security and a Contributing Editor to The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He has published widely on nonproliferation issues. Concern about an Iranian bomb increased earlier this year when Russia signed a contract to complete the construction of a moribund nuclear power plant at Bushehr in Iran and supply it with several other nuclear facilities, including a gas centrifuge plant that could make highly-enriched uranium. Although Iran is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Western governments maintain that Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapon program that is about five to 15 years from its goal at its present level of outside assistance. Although the U.S. government welcomed Russia’s decision at the U.S.-Russian Summit on May 10 to drop the supply of the gas centrifuge plant, it wants Russia to cancel the entire agreement. Not only does a power reactor produce large amounts of plutonium that could be misused in a crisis, the agreement represents a more immediate danger whereby Iran could improve its nuclear weapon infrastructure. Iran could also use the deal as a cover to obtain sensitive nuclear technologies, materials, and equipment critical for producing separated plutonium or highly-enriched uranium. Russia says that the light-water reactor (LWR) it is providing is the same type the United States is promising to North Korea, which, unlike Iran, is in violation of its safeguards agreement under the NPT. This inconsistency in U.S. policy feeds opinions in Russia that the United States is hypocritical and that its real intent is to eliminate Russia’s struggling nuclear export industry. Unlike North Korea, however, which has agreed to trade a more capable program for a less capable one, Iran’s nuclear weapon efforts can gain much from Russian nuclear cooperation. Civil nuclear cooperation was misused by Iraq and Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s when they covertly obtained a wide variety of equipment and know-how for their nuclear weapon programs from Europe, Asia, and the United States. Both countries demonstrated an amazing ability to find suppliers willing to turn a blind eye to the risk posed by an export or, in some cases, willing to violate export control laws. Iran has attempted, with limited success, to follow a similar procurement strategy in Western Europe. However, more stringent export controls following the Persian Gulf War have stopped many transactions. With weakly enforced export control laws and individuals hungry for business, Russia may be a more fruitful market for centrifuge, plutonium separation, and other nuclear related items. If Russia will not cancel the deal, it will need to create more stringent conditions on its own industrial enterprises and to insist on greater transparency on Iranian nuclear activities.