The Russian General Staff and Asia, 1800–1917 by Alex Marshall (review)

Abstract

449 Ab Imperio, 3/2008 From a technical-editorial point of view, this edition achieves the high standards of contemporary Russian document publications. The documents are well-annotated and a concise biographical index contributes to usability. Only the lack of a subject index, a list of archives or a bibliography can be considered a minus, apart from some flaws in the annotation of foreign-language terms (for example, on P. 139, the German “gratuliere” is annotated as being French, and the French “aidememoire ” on P. 294 is declared Latin). In its thematic spectrum, the edition is absolutely essential. Not only does it illuminate thematic subissues like the ones outlined above, but with its multitude of layers and perspectives, it gives a dense picture of Lithuanian-Soviet relations on the eve of Lithuania’s annexation. It would be extremely important to popularize the edition in Russia, where it could help to fight imperial stereotypes and historiographical taboos that dominate public discourse. Andrew GENTES Alex Marshall, The Russian General Staff and Asia, 1800-1917 (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). xii+274 pp. Tables, Figures, Bibliography, Index. ISBN: 0-41535561 -3. The topic covered in this book is of potential interest to specialists in military affairs, foreign policy, imperialism, and international relations . As of 1800 the empire had annexed most of its Asian territory, though significant expansion would continue with acquisition of the Caucasus, the so-called “stans,” the Amur Territory (which had been ceded to China in 1689), and Sakhalin Island. This Drang nach Osten brought within the realm peoples of various languages, ethnicities, and cultures; significantly lengthened the border with China; and made next-door neighbours of Ottoman Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and Japan. In addition to provoking imperial competition with the latter it also heightened rivalry with Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. It conditioned Russians’Weltanschauungen and influenced domestic policies including the decisions to build the Trans-Siberian railroad and to deport convicts to Sakhalin. Understanding the motivations and methods behind this expansion is 450 Рецензии/Reviews underestimated the Japanese while overestimating the threat from Central Asian Muslims. Also questionable is Marshall’s brief discussion of Foucault. He argues that the general staff’s socalled Asiatic Departments at least superficially “performed… a panoptic surveillance function akin to that attributed by Foucault to the modern state in general” (P. 177). Marshall refers to Jeremy Bentham’s ideal prison, which he claims was inspired by his tour of Nicholas I’s Russia. Actually, plans for the Panopticon were inspired by Jeremy’s brother Samuel, who during the 1780s developed techniques to better manage the English and Scottish craftsmen working under him at Potemkin’s Krichev estate. Similar to his treatment of Said, Marshall distorts Foucault’s ideas, in part by coining the term “panoptic knowledge” (P. 180), which I have never come across and which seems to conflate two different foci of Foucault’s thinking , the first being a disciplinary method of surveillance, the second being the general discursive production of knowledges with the goal of instrumentalizing subjects. Both are strategies of power, but each is distinct from the other. The Panopticon ’s ability to make a subject discipline himself by internalizing an external gaze was what made it crucial to understanding Russia itself during this period. Alex Marshall begins his study with an engaging anecdote about his youthful fascination with the paintings of Vasilii Vereshchagin, whose depictions of lands and peoples dominated by tsarist forces both romanticized and critiqued imperialism. This invocation of Vereshchagin reasonably leads the reader to expect a Saidean analysis that will illuminate Orientalism’s influence upon the general staff. However, Marshall rejects such a reading, arguing that “Said’s thesis of an instinctively racialist and blinkered orientalism” does not pertain in this case, because the “military vostokovedy were primarily concerned with the contemporary situation in Asiatic states” and did not share a view of Asia as “unchanging and backward” (P. 185). This formulation distorts Said’s theory, however, for in his book Orientalism British and French imperialists’ views of the Orientalized Other are described as complex and involving both praise and belittlement; and, in any case, such views turned upon discursive constructions whose functional intent...