Estimates of the Armed Forces and war plans of Great Britain in Central and South Asia by officers of the Russian General Staff in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

Abstract

The essay is devoted to the intelligence assessment of planning for war against Great Britain in Central Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The systematic preparation for war against Great Britain began during the Pandjeh Incident of 1885 and continued until 1914. Russian war planning foresaw offensive operations against the British Indian Army in Central Asia. The development of the “Invasion of India” plan became a high-priority objective for the Russian General Staff during the lowest point of relations with Great Britain. After 1905, the development of this plan was abandoned. Study of the British Indian Army and possible enemy war plans in Central Asia by Russian military intelligence played an important role in the war planning. The Russian General Staff's preparation for a war against Afghanistan and British India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was carried out with a lack of information about the region and enemies. After the Russo-Japanese war, the War Ministry began paying more attention to the conduct of intelligence activities and the scientific analysis of information about the region. Since 1904, Russian military intelligence had observed the development of a large-scale reform of the British Indian Army, initiated by General H. Kitchener. The Russian General Staff came to the wrong conclusions about the threat to Turkestan. Therefore, exaggerated estimates of the military readiness and plans of Great Britain influenced Russian strategic planning and brought about the cancellation of the “Invasion of India” plan in 1905-1910.