Abstract

AbstractDrawing on the cases of Iraq and Sudan, it can be argued that the mobilization of economic, cultural, and organizational resources along with the concentration of state resources have led to the radicalization of Islamist parties' positions and political discourse. The concentration of resources was an incentive to reward loyalists, support hard‐line discourse, and target opponents by excluding them from political competition. This situation has helped develop a secular and national protest movement that does not believe in the change through elections and political–legal tools, but rather through protest and, in some cases, violent confrontations. However, this secular trans‐sectarian national movement still lacks the ability to mobilize alternative political, economic, and leadership resources to present a coherent and counter a vision for the ruling Islamist parties.

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