Abstract

AbstractIn 1971, (Lord) Victor Rothschild, reported to Government on “The Organisation and Management of Government R&D” and how government could become (in his words) a customer for research contracted from the Research Councils and other sources. Rothschild’s thinking implied that management of R&D by “customer” Departments would bring an understanding of research outputs. He proposed the transfer of applied science funds from Research Councils to Government Departments, providing each with a Chief Scientist as proxy customer for research to be commissioned on a “customer/contractor” basis. The Government largely adopted his proposals in 1972 and implemented them in 1974. The Rothschild reforms and the upheavals they brought were controversial at the time, though now in some instances, reversed and otherwise either forgotten or buried in unconscious assumptions. However, the Rothschild framework still underpins important assumptions about Departmental relationships with the science community, which in my view adversely affected the access of Government to expert advice. From the viewpoint of a participant in Government R&D management through this period, I explore the immediate response and the post-1980 history of the Rothschild reforms, discuss the way in which research commissioning became such a heavy task as to impede analysis and advice delivery, and consider alternative approaches, such as the “science broker” model. This article is published as part of a collection on scientific advice to governments.

Highlights

  • Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and the Agriculture Research Council (ARC) before Rothschild The history of relationships between MAFF and ARC concerning agricultural R&D is one of mutual suspicion (Williams, 1973; Thirtle et al, 1991; DeJager, 1993)

  • On the strength of these conclusions, Rothschild recommended the establishment of a customer function for R&D in Departments to be supported by a Chief Scientist (II.10) to help customers decide on R&D programmes and their funding, and approve capital expenditure related to research (II.9)

  • He preferred the title of Chief Scientist “to that of Chief Scientific Adviser because he must be closely associated with the decisions in paragraph .... [II]9 ... ”, that is, the Chief Scientist’s role was to be primarily that of an adviser on research commissioning

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Summary

Introduction

MAFF and the ARC before Rothschild The history of relationships between MAFF and ARC concerning agricultural R&D is one of mutual suspicion (Williams, 1973; Thirtle et al, 1991; DeJager, 1993).

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