Abstract
Support for populism has grown substantially during the past 2 decades, a development that has coincided with a marked increase in the experience of negative affect around the world. We use a multimodal, multimethod empirical approach, with data from a diverse set of geographical and political contexts, to investigate the extent to which the rising electoral demand for populism can be explained by negative affect. We demonstrate that negative affect-measured via (a) self-reported emotions in surveys as well as (b) automated text analyses of Twitter data-predicts individual-level populist attitudes in two global surveys (Studies 1a and 1b), longitudinal changes in populist party vote shares at general elections in Europe (Study 2), district-level Brexit voting in the 2016 U.K. referendum (Study 3), and county-level vote shares for Donald Trump in the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections (Studies 4a and 4b). We find that negative emotions-such as fear and anger as well as more often overlooked low-arousal negative emotions like depression and sadness-are predictive of populist beliefs as well as voting and election results at scale. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
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