Abstract
This paper aims to present the role of intelligence services in the American foreign policy using as a case study the Afghan conflict from 1979-1989. Thus, this paper underlines the actions (or inactions) of the American intelligence services, highlighting their limitations from this period. It is important to describe the context that contributed to the start of the soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the two perspectives (American and Soviet) over the conflict. In this regard, we considered necessary an analysis on the Soviet point of view regarding the conflict and, most importantly, concerning the American involvement, having in mind the purpose of objectiveness while presenting the context and events. Using the relevant documents, testimonies and statements of former CIA officials from that period, the paper underlines the way foreign policy decisions were taken by the Administrations from Washington, during the Soviet-Afghan war, and how American intelligence services influenced the foreign policy decision-making process and the evolution of the conflict.
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