The Road to Crecy: The English Invasion of France, 1346 (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: The Road to Crécy: The English Invasion of France, 1346 Paul Solon The Road to Crécy: The English Invasion of France, 1346. By Marilyn Livingstone and Morgen Witzel. London: Pearson Education, 2005. ISBN 0-528-78420-4. Maps. Photographs. Illustrations. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xi, 353. £19.99. Battle narrative is the most popular form of military history, particularly for the mythical "general" reader for whom The Road to Crécy is intended. Livingstone and Witzel begin well, describing the armament, constitution, and tactics of the opposed forces, contrasting the outmoded reliance of the French on the offensive élan of heavy cavalry and the innovative English emphasis on tactical defense employing an infantry of armored men-at-arms shielded by archers. After delineating the strategic circumstances of the war, the book turns to the spring of 1346 when England launched three incursions into France. Edward III personally commanded the war's first great chevauchée, landing on the Contentin peninsula on 12 July and leading a force of 15,000 into Normandy. Whatever Edward's hopes may have been regarding his reception in a land he claimed as his own, his army became an invading force looting its way south and threatening Paris. French King Philip VI assembled a vastly larger defensive army and both commanders offered and declined battles on unfavorable terms. Edward finally turned north when an attempt to trap him against the Seine failed in mid-August and Philip pursued, again failing to trap the English when they crossed the Somme in a remarkable feat of arms. Frustrated, Philip hurried after and foolishly accepted battle on the invader's terms on 26 August when his ill-disciplined, ill-coordinated force assaulted the well-emplaced English at Crécy only to be slaughtered by the combined powers of the English archers and men-at-arms. No longer threatened, the victorious English proceeded to besiege and capture Calais, ensuring easy English entry into France for the remainder of the war. The story of the campaign is well told, but offers little new battle analysis. The description of the mobilization and supply of the force is the book's greatest strength. A day-by-day account of the campaign illustrates the complexities of the situation, as the authors note how baggage trains limit the speed of an army in the field, and humanizes the participants by the simple device of listing daily menus. There is a welcome if unorthodox personality to these descriptions as we are asked to compare the army's diet to that of Dr. Atkins, to imagine the smell of a campsite of an army on high fiber foods, or to consider the respective powers of a long-bow and a .357 magnum revolver. Best of all for many will be the description of routes with specific references to modern French roads and the many comparisons with the Normandy campaign of 1944. In short, the book provides an accessible and informative, but ultimately redundant, account of a heroic tale in English history. It has both the strengths and weaknesses expected in a work from writers with little previous experience in the field who are reasonably well read but insensitive to the complexities and breadth of recent scholarship. One can sense John [End Page 1197] Keegan's influence but neither he nor other masters of the history of battle such as John Lynn or Geoffrey Parker are employed. The authoritative work of Clifford J. Rodgers is referenced, though hardly substantively encountered, and Kelly DeVries's essential analysis of the battle is entirely ignored. The general reader may be satisfied, but professional military historians will rely on other recent or soon to appear works. Paul Solon Macalester College St. Paul, Minnesota Copyright © 2005 Society for Military History