The Bloody Triangle: The Defeat of Soviet Armor in the Ukraine, June 1941 (review)

Historians have had a great deal of difficulty accounting for the debacle wrought by Operation Barbarossa. How could the Red Army, a large and heavily equipped force, be so thoroughly decimated by the Wehrmacht, especially when evidence of the impending attack was plentiful? Most commonly, explanations have focused on the unexpectedly rapid success of the Blitzkrieg in western Europe, the impact of the Great Purges on the Soviet officer corps, the problems of reequipping the Red Army with modern weaponry and protecting newly expanded borders, the lack of adequate training for the rapidly growing Soviet armed forces, the confusing nature of available intelligence, and, most of all, the nearly fatal self-delusion of Iosif Stalin, which prevented the implementation of proper defensive measures. Although Stalin certainly realized that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was no more than a temporary truce and that a German attack was ultimately inevitable, he deluded himself that Adolf Hitler could be appeased until Soviet forces had grown strong enough to meet the Nazi assault. Soviet shipments of petroleum products, various raw materials, and foodstuffs were critically important to the German war machine and, thus, the key element in Stalin's strategy of appeasing Hitler.

In 1940 Hitler made his most important decision, to attack Russia.• If he had any settled aims, this was one of them. In 1924, in Mein Kampf, Hitler had urged territorial expansion and insisted that ‘when we speak of new lands to give living space to the German people in the struggle for existence we must first think of Russia and her border states’.

3. Operation Barbarossa: The German Attack on the Soviet Union, 1941

In the early morning of 22 June 1941 the German attack on territory in the hands of the Soviet Union began. On a front more than 3000 km wide, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, struck three army groups — North, Centre and South — with a strength of 135 divisions, seventeen of them panzer, with more than 3500 tanks supported by more than 4500 aircraft. The additional Finnish front, about 700km wide, contained twenty divisions supported by 600 aircraft. The reserve consisted of twenty-four divisions, two of which were armoured. Altogether this came to about 5.5 million men equipped with modern weapons and already to a large extent hardened by fighting in Poland, Norway, France and the Balkans. Within a few days later, the Germans were joined by Italian, Romanian, Slovak, Finnish and Hungarian divisions. Amongst the German units and usually in the Waffen SS were detachments of Belgian, French, Dutch, Norwegian and Spanish volunteers. There were even also around 800 Swiss.1KeywordsPolish UnitDiplomatic RelationSoviet GovernmentPolitical PrisonerSoviet Socialist RepublicThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Chapter 4 The German Attack, the Soviet Response, Sunday, 22 June 1941

Pre-1941: Dobrush, town and raion center, Gomel’ oblast’, Belorussian SSR; 1941–1944: Dobrusch, Rear Area, Army Group Center (rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet Mitte); post-1991: Dobrush, raen center, Homel’ voblasts’, Republic of Belarus Dobrush is located 25 kilometers (16 miles) east of Gomel’ on the Iput’ River. The town has a railway station on the Gomel’-Unecha line. In 1926, there were 372 Jewish inhabitants (2.7 percent of the total population of 13,800). Following the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, many refugees arrived in Dobrush. Dobrush was strategically significant, as it lay on the main rail line through Briansk to Moscow, so the Luftwaffe bombed the town. More than two thirds of the Jews in Dobrush managed to leave the town, either as staff of a factory or government organization or indepen dently on foot towards Gomel’.1 German forces occupied Dobrush on August 22, 1941. During the German occupation, Dobrush was subordinated to Rear Area, Army Group Cent...

Анотація. Мета роботи – проаналізувати становище єврейського населення Східної Галичини в період Першої світової війни з серпня 1914 по червень 1915 рр. Методологія дослідження: дотримання принципів об’єктивності та історизму сприяло розкриттю передумов, сутності та наслідків діяльності російської адміністрації протягом усього окупаційного періоду щодо єврейської спільноти Східної Галичини. Наукова новизна полягає у комплексному висвітленні проблеми ставлення цивільної адміністрації та військового командування до місцевого населення та національних меншин аналізі суспільно-політичних та економічних процесів напередодні та в роки російської окупаційної адміністрації, що донині не було предметом спеціального історичного дослідження. Зроблено спробу відтворити картину політичних змін у структурі галицького багатонаціонального суспільства, де з’явилася соціальна категорія – біженці. Введено до наукового обігу нові архівні матеріали, що дозволили узагальнити становище єврейської спільноти Галичини у роки Першої світової війни. Висновки. Захоплення галицького краю російськими військами супроводжувалося насильницькою політикою до місцевого населення й національних меншин краю. Бездіяльність влади призводила до масових грабунків та проявів насильства з боку військових щодо євреїв. Антиєврейська політика Росії на Південно-Західному фронті негативно позначилася на міжнародному іміджі держави, що створювало додаткові перешкоди для отримання країною зовнішніх кредитів. Політика переслідування юдейського населення з боку держави призвела до конфронтації в суспільстві, породження стереотипів які закріпилися в суспільній свідомості, де євреї виступають як вороги, зрадники, лихварі, спекулянти, яких звинувачували у всіх внутрішньодержавних та військових прорахунках імперії. 
 Ключові слова: єврейська меншина, окупація, Східна Галичина, Російська імперія, Перша Світова війна.

(1995). Planning for war: The red army and the catastrophe of 1941. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 47, No. 8, pp. 1293-1326.

Preface Part One: The Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union Prior to World Two 1. Jews in Czarist Russia 2. Jews in the USSR and in the Annexed Territories between the Two World Wars Part Two: The Impact of Political and Military Developments on the Jews of Eastern Europe September 1, 1939 - June 22, 1941 3. German - Soviet Relations and Geo-Political Changes in eastern Europe 4. The Jews in the Soviet Annexed Territories 5. Preparations in Germany for the Attack on the Soviet Union and the Annihilation of the Jews Part Three: German Attack on the Soviet Union 6. Invasion under the Slogan War on Judeo-Bolshevism 7. Evacuation of Soviet Population - Jews in Organized and Individual Evacuation 8. Anti-Jewish Pogroms During the Early Days of the Occupation 9. The German Administration in the Occupied Territories and its Anti-Jewish Policy Part Four: Mass Murder - First Stage: June 22, 1941 - Winter 1941/42 10. Einsatzgruppen Routes of Advance and Method of Extermination 11. Reichskommissariat Ostland - Ghettos and Extermination 12. Reichskommissariat Ukraine - Ghettos and Extermination 13. Military Administration Areas - Ghettos and Extermination 14. Extermination of the Jews of Crimea 15. The German Army from Freedom of Action for the Einsatzgruppen to Active Collaboration in the Murders 16. Persecution of the Jews in District Galicia 17. Romania and Transnistria - Expulsion and Mass Murder Part Five: Mass Murder - Second Stage: From Spring to Late 1942 18. The Annihilation in Ostland and in Grodno-Volkovysk Region (Generalbezirk Bialystok) 19. Annihilation in Reichskommissariat Ukraine 20. Mass Murder in District Galicia - Operation Reinhard 21. Annihilation in Area under Military Administration 22. Transnistria - Life in the Shadow of Death Part Six: Mass Murder - Third Stage: From Early 1943 until the End of German Occupation 23. Liquidation of the Last Ghettos in Reichskommissariat Ostland 24. Liquidation of the Last Ghettos in Reichskommissariat Ukraine 25. Survival in Transnistria

About the Discussion Note: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the Department of Defense or any other government agency. The Conflict in Abkhazia The conflict in Abkhazia ended tragically in the autumn of 1993. Some viewed the conflict as an ethnic clash between Abkhazians and Georgians, but it was much more complex than that. There were many nationality groups involved, including ethnic Abkhazians, Georgians, Russians, the Confederation of North Caucasian Mountain Peoples, Armenians, and Turks. Dr. Gachechiladze provided the following background on the positions of these groups: Abkhazians for a long time were integrated with Georgians. For social reasons, Abkhazians were cited as Abkhazians on their passports. Being identified as an Abkhazian provided individuals with certain advantages in the former U.S.S.R. and in Abkhazia itself. The highest ranking officials in institutions in Abkhazia were Abkhazians. From the some 70,000 Abkhazians, only a few hundred started aggravating the situation in Abkhazia. Abkhazian leaders were Leninists and pressed for separation from Georgia. They sought support from people who had been associated with the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union and from the Russian armed forces. Russia's leaders, dismayed at Russia's loss of status as a superpower, seek to have Russia be at least a regional power. They have never given up their claim of authority over former U.S.S.R. territory and want to restore their authority in these areas. They want to maintain their power and military bases in the territory of the former U.S.S.R. One of the main targets of Russia's claims was Georgia. The Russians provoked the South Ossetians into fighting for separatism from Georgia. Russia also helped defeat Georgian forces in the fighting with the Abkhazian separatists; with Georgia weakened, Russia was able to restore much of its influence in Georgia. The civil war in Georgia was inspired, plotted, and provoked by forces from outside Georgia, particularly in Russia. Russian civilian and military intelligence organizations perpetuated the civil war. The Russians denied involvement and spoke of an Abkhazian navy and army, but how could 70,000 people acquire tanks and bombers. Russian Defense Minister Grachev went so far as to claim that Georgians had painted aircraft to look Russian and then bombed the port city of Sukhumi themselves. Professor Gachechiladze indicated that he thought that former Georgian leader Gamsakhurdia did not commit suicide, as was announced, but was killed. Georgia, weakened by the fighting with the Abkhazians who were supported by Russians and by economic difficulties, was forced to join the Commonwealth of Independent States and to grant official status to three Russian military bases in Georgia. Russian troops are now in Georgia legally. The Confederation of North Caucasian Mountain Peoples is a relatively new movement established by Chechens designed to unite different nationalities in the area. This movement has a well-organized governing body, and its key uniting force is Islam. The leaders want to unite this part of Russia and then move north. Their key problem is that they have no access to the Black Sea, and it is for this reason that they wanted Abkhazia to be a part of their confederation. They made Sukhumi the capital of their confederation. With ports on the Black Sea, they could export oil and other resources and bring in armaments, while being free of Russia's control. Their supporters fought on the separatists' side. Armenia has its own problems with the Nagorno- Karabakh province. Armenia controls one quarter of Azerbaijan's territory and is watching develop- ments in Abkhazia to see if an Abkhazian state emerges that could be used as a precedent or model for Nagorno-Karabakh. …

The purpose of the study is to clarify the peculiarities of the presentation of modern Russian aggression against Ukraine by correspondents of the British news service “BBC News”. The methodological basis of the work is an interdisciplinary approach. Such methods as structural and functional system analysis of historiographical facts and the method of critical analysis of documentary material have been particularly important in research implementation. Scientific novelty: for the first time, the article analyses the reception of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the writings of BBC News journalists. Result. We have concluded that most publications presented a description of the immediate events of the military confrontation, which is consistent with the news focus of the information resource itself. BBC News journalists have provided a detailed report on war crimes committed by Russian troops and Putin-backed separatists. This thematic block also dedicates a lot of the articles to the downing of the MH17 passenger plane in the summer of 2014. The previous story is directly related to the problem of the human price of Putin’s adventure, so BBC News periodically cited UN data on the steady increase of casualties in the Russian-Ukrainian war. Because of such devastating losses for Ukraine’s human potential, the journalists covered in detail the attempts to settle the Russian-Ukrainian war peacefully, focusing on the Minsk process. Another notable topic for BBC News is the Kremlin prisoners. Journalists have repeatedly raised the issue of the economic component of Putin’s aggression. They cited numerous indications that the Russian leadership had tried to destroy the eastern neighbour’s economy by gas blackmail, blocking Ukrainian ports, and stealing or destroying the industrial infrastructure of the occupied territories. The comprehensive attention of British journalists to the latest Ukrainian tragedy is also reflected by the attempt to recreate the daily life of the military conflict, first of all, the lives of ordinary people in the occupied territories. We have concluded that the study showed that BBC News journalists paid a lot of attention to the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Their objective approach to covering Russian aggression has influenced the formation of pro-Ukrainian public opinion in Britain, which has also helped neutralize Putin’s efforts in the country’s information field. As a result, Ukraine is continually supported by official London, despite changes in political government in both countries. This is an important factor in curbing the expansionist appetites of the current Russian leadership.

Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, began the largest and most costly campaign in military history. Its failure was a key turning point of the Second World War. The operation was planned as a Blitzkrieg to win Germany its Lebensraum in the east, and the summer of 1941 is well-known for the German army's unprecedented victories and advances. Yet the German Blitzkrieg depended almost entirely upon the motorised Panzer groups, particularly those of Army Group Centre. Using archival records, in this book David Stahel presents a history of Germany's summer campaign from the perspective of the two largest and most powerful Panzer groups on the Eastern front. Stahel's research provides a fundamental reassessment of Germany's war against the Soviet Union, highlighting the prodigious internal problems of the vital Panzer forces and revealing that their demise in the earliest phase of the war undermined the whole German invasion.

The Sino-German Relations before the Second Sino-Japanese War has been explored by numerous scholars in history. But for Nanjing Nationalist Government, such exploration between this relation and Guangdong area was extremely limited. The area’s particular influence in politics, economy and military force has made Guangdong Issue an important political focus for the government in 1930. Henceforth, together with studies in Guangdong Government and Sino-German relations, the author attempts to delve into issues between Nanjing Nationalist Government and Guangdong in order to explain this complex and delicate tri-sided relation with a Guangdong stance. For the German side, the Nanjing Government seemed to have superiority in military size, supplies and battle experiences, as well as considerable financial ability with tax income from provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Zhejiang. Moreover, the Plutocrats of Jiansu and Zhejiang’s funding brought significant advantage to the government. Politically, the Central Government, which gave direct orders to Guangdong Government, was another advantage for the Nanjing side. Despite the area’s dominance, Germans did not completely concentrate their focus on the Nanjing side, possibly due to the political uncertainties in China, or that more resources were still available in Guangdong, causing Germans to have differences in approaches. German’s ministry of defense and ministry of foreign affairs had differences in benefits to settle, while military and industrial figures, and other arm traffickers, such as Klein, exerted their influences. The clash in benefits from different sides formed considerable issues in the Sino-German Relations before the Second Sino-Japanese War. German-Guangdong’s collaboration made it clear that the trade was both feasible and adventuresome for all 3 sides. It is interesting to note that the initiation of Klein Project in Guangdong was based on the distrusts and splits between Nanjing and Canton. In fact, most collaboration between German and Guangdong appeared and disappeared based on political situations. In short, the tri-sided relation among Germany, Guangdong and Nanjing’s was extremely delicate: the needs from all 3 sides formed this project and evolved into to 3 concerns, which in nature were mainly for benefits. This study aims to explore German’s progress in this tri-sided relation under benefit concerns in 1930’s, especially in 1933, when NSDAP took charge. It was clear when examine afterwards that the trade of Tungsten, munitions, and the presence of Germen consultants played crucial roles in the rise of Nazi Germany, its early victories in World War II, and China’s ability to fight against Japan in the beginning of the war. The exploration of this topic serves special historical meanings of Sino-German relation before and after World War II.

a year has passed since the uprising in Eastern Germany, which the Manchester Guardian justly termed of the decisive events of our time. Now that the fog of rumours, exaggerations, denials and misrepresentations has cleared away, it seems possible to see the sensational happening of June 17 in their proper perspective. It was evident from the outset that such a revolt of the masses could not fully succeed as long as Russian troops were stationed in the Eastern zone. But even though it was doomed to failure in certain respects, must we concede that the whole heroic struggle was in vain? Or are we permitted to consider the 17th June as a turning point not only for Eastern Germany but for the whole area behind the Iron Curtain? A sober examination of the situation as it appeared in December, 1953, may provide the answer to these questions. No doubt, most of the key figures of the regime in the Soviet zone are still around, although the workers had made it clear on June 17 that they wanted a change from top to bottom. The symbolic head of the German Democratic Republic, Wihelm Pieck, was demonstratively re-elected in October for another term by the two houses of the East German parliament. Pieck, one of the last survivors from the early days of German communism, is old and not in good health. He had been absent during the critical June days. Originally, only a brief extension of his first term had been planned, but finally it seemed desirable to retain this figurehead for another four years, and the occasion of his re-election was used for some oratorical fireworks. Pieck will continue to reside in the old Hohenzollern palace in Niederschonhausen, but the real decisions will be made elsewhere. It is most unlikely that Otto Grotewohl will ever make them, although he, too, has been retained after the June revolt. The Minister President of the German Democratic Republic does not enjoy an independent position comparable to that of Chancellor

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