Abstract
It is widely agreed that, since World War II, primary responsibility for leadership in American foreign policy has rested with the President. The role of Congress has been of secondary importance and on many critical issues Congress has had very little influence. This essay examines the "decline of Congress" in the context of the Vietnam War. The major argument is that Congress, by fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities in the foreign policy field, and by resisting the temptation to approve automatically presidential initiatives in foreign policy, may help prevent the United States from re peating the errors of Vietnam. At the very least, congres sional vigilance in this field will help clarify policy choices and subject executive proposals to the public scrutiny that they deserve.
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