Abstract
The purpose of this Comment is to put the current debate regarding testing necessary conditions into perspective and to point out a particularly troubling aspect of the “all cases” research design (Seawright 2002).Prior to the recent spate of books and articles in the social sciences (Ragin 1987; Dion 1988; Braumoeller and Goertz 2000), the debate over the testing or the confirmation of necessary conditions took place in the philosophical literature, mainly in terms of Hempel's (1945) paradox of the ravens. In what follows, I briefly review Hempel's paradox and the Bayesian solution to it. I argue that Seawright's account, while Bayesian in nature, relies on an assumption that no Bayesian would be willing to make.
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