Abstract
This chapter begins by examining Jerry Fodor and the rationalist tradition. For Fodor, brains are semantic engines driven by intentional states. Based on his two works, The Language of Thought, and Representations, intentionality is primarily, originally, a real feature of our brains, and language is intentional only in a secondary sense because it describes the real features of the mind. Secondly, the chapter presents evidence for the language of thought: concept learning, language learning, and perception. It cites some a priori reasons for adopting the language of thought hypothesis. Thirdly, it elaborates on intentionality, representational theory of mind, and folk psychology. Lastly, it takes a closer look into Fodor's account of concept formation and differentiates connectionism and the representational theory of mind.
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