Language learning and the representational theory of mind

Abstract

In J. A. Fodor1 we have a new and very up-to-date champion of the representational theory of mind (RTM), the theory that an organism's cognitive relations to the world are mediated by a system of mental representations. According to Fodor, Descartes and other 17th and 18th century philosophers were essentially correct in their approach to understanding the mind; it was in the details of their mentalistic models and in their preoccupation with epistemological problems that they went wrong. Originally the RTM was adopted, not because of its plausibility as an explanatory theory in psychology, but because it was able, prima facie, to meet the stringent demands of a foundationalist epistemology. On Fodor's view, however, the RTM can be dis associated from epistemology (see pp. 44-45) as convincingly as Kepler's laws can be separated from his fantastic views about the solar system. To salvage the laws in this way requires showing them to be part of a different and viable theory. In other words, Kepler's laws are not self-evidently acceptable but are acceptable only insofar as they are grounded in a viable theoretical framework. Kepler's mysticism about perfect geometric solids does not provide such a framework; New tonian physics, on the other hand, does. Likewise the RTM needs a new theoretical grounding. It has been argued, and Fodor seems to accept, that the foundationalist program has been discredited. (In any case, Fodor wants to turn his back on epistemological issues.2) With the loss of this original theoretical foundation, the RTM must be newly grounded. This is achieved, according to Fodor, in the work of contemporary cognitive psychology. But how does work in cognitive psychology provide a new and viable theoretic grounding for the RTM, a theory so appropriate for answer ing the "scope and limits" problem of knowledge? Fodor's argument is simple and straighforward (p. 27):