Abstract
O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar algumas vantagens das teorias representacional e computacional da mente quando comparadas a outras visões, especialmente o behaviorismo. A ideia é que as teorias representacionais e computacionais nos permitem conceber atitudes proposicionais (estados mentais, como crenças e desejos) de uma forma que preserva duas características essenciais que consideramos que elas têm nas explicações psicológicas do senso comum: avaliabilidade semântica e eficácia causal. O Behaviorismo reconcebe os estados mentais de uma forma que não preserva essas características essenciais. Ao fazer isso, o sucesso da psicologia do senso comum torna-se um mistério. Ilustro algumas das dificuldades que o behaviorismo enfrenta ao considerar e criticar a abordagem de Wittgenstein da compreensão linguística. O resultado é que as teorias representacionais e computacionais da mente fazem um trabalho melhor em defender a psicologia do senso comum e, portanto, devem ser preferidas em comparação com o behaviorismo.
Highlights
Lara went to the bakery because she wanted to buy bread and cookies
We have seen that the representational and the computational theories of mind conceive mental states such as beliefs and desires as relations that individuals have to mental representations, and mental processes as algorithmic transformations of mental representations
They preserve the essential properties that propositional attitudes have for common sense psychology, namely, semantic evaluability and causal efficacy
Summary
Lara went to the bakery because she wanted to buy bread and cookies. There she was partly successful: she got the bread but she found out that, contrary to what she believed, they didn’t sell cookies. Attributions of propositional attitudes, conceived as being both causally efficacious and semantically evaluable, are central to our understanding of ourselves and others, in that they allow us to predict and explain behavior A theory that denied that intentional mental states are causally efficacious and semantically evaluable would force us to reconceive our common sense psychological explanations, possibly implying their falsity. The conclusion is that representational and computational theories, unlike behaviorism, are compatible with common sense and with cognitive psychology, and so are to be preferred
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