The Regulation of Understanding through Intellectual Virtue: Some Implications for Doctoral Education

Abstract

Introduction Contemporary educational theory and philosophy is awash in competing theoretical and philosophical orientations. From critical postmodernism, to constructivism, to post-positivism--scholars have a veritable smorgasbord of theoretical options to choose from. And this is not without its problems. Aaron Pallas (2006) has argued that education programs have failed to prepare future scholars for the diversity characteristic of contemporary educational theory. He notes, experienced researchers and novices alike find it hard to keep up with the cacophony of diverse epistemologies (p. 6). The problem is that range of theories of available to budding and seasoned scholars alike is often overwhelming, and schools of education often give too little attention to adequately training future professors in basic epistemology. As a result, researchers are sometimes initiated into particular theoretical camps, possessing little of the philosophical underpinnings of other perspectives. In other cases, they are given a cursory scan of the major frameworks and accrue only a skin-deep command of any given epistemological point-of-view. This is problematic, he argues, because an adequate understanding of epistemology is central to the production and consumption of educational (p. 6). In other words, one's understanding and capacity to produce creative scholarly work hinges on an ability to identify and understand the epistemological commitments of multiple perspectives. Moreover, the significance of proper doctoral training extends beyond mere adequate professional development; it also has moral implications. Professors of education inform policy, design curricula, prepare future educators, provide in-service training for school districts, and serve as bulwarks against detrimental educational ideologies--roles entailing a moral or normative stance toward the broader enterprise of education. Golde and Walker (2006) persuasively suggest that professors are stewards of the discipline. They write, The use of the label steward is deliberately intended to convey a role that transcends a collection of accomplishments and skills. It has an ethical and moral dimension. Definitions of stewardship suggest core principles of stewardship that inform the term steward of the discipline. It calls to mind various historical uses and definitions. (p. 12) Professors are not merely highly skilled creators and purveyors of knowledge, but also caretakers, guardians, and conservators of our fields. We are stakeholders in a longer multi-generational and historical conversation, which entails a moral stance toward the health of the profession. For this reason greater attention should be paid to moral dimensions of doctoral education. Calling for an revolution, Nicholas Maxwell (2007) echoes the preceding sentiment by drawing attention to academicians' pivotal role in the wellbeing of humankind and the environment. In this way he directs our attention to the role of academia outside its ivy-covered walls. He writes, Instead of devoting itself primarily to solving problems of knowledge, academic inquiry needs to give intellectual priority to the task of discovering possible solutions to problems of living (p. 98). To this end he argues for a wholesale turn from knowledge as the primary aim of academic inquiry. Rather, Maxwell would have scholars pursue wisdom concerning these global plights. If the preceding views are correct, then attention ought to be given to their development as stewards and, as I will eventually argue, toward the cultivation of virtuous habits of mind. Given the expansiveness of educational research and its moral dimensions--and the putative stakes involved--what should the aim of doctoral education be? More specifically, when it comes to evaluating and creating works of knowledge, what would a successful PhD student look like? …