The Rebound Attack: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Whirlpool and Grøstl

Abstract

In this work, we propose the rebound attack, a new tool for the cryptanalysis of hash functions. The idea of the rebound attack is to use the available degrees of freedom in a collision attack to efficiently bypass the low probability parts of a differential trail. The rebound attack consists of an inbound phase with a match-in-the-middle part to exploit the available degrees of freedom, and a subsequent probabilistic outbound phase. Especially on AES based hash functions, the rebound attack leads to new attacks for a surprisingly high number of rounds.We use the rebound attack to construct collisions for 4.5 rounds of the 512-bit hash function Whirlpool with a complexity of 2120 compression function evaluations and negligible memory requirements. The attack can be extended to a near-collision on 7.5 rounds of the compression function of Whirlpool and 8.5 rounds of the similar hash function Maelstrom. Additionally, we apply the rebound attack to the SHA-3 submission Grøstl, which leads to an attack on 6 rounds of the Grøstl-256 compression function with a complexity of 2120 and memory requirements of about 264.KeywordsWhirlpool Grøstl Maelstromhash functioncollision attacknear-collision