The Reasons of a Materialist

Abstract

Can there be any reasons that a materialist could cogently offer in favour of materialism? Peter Glassen thinks not.1 He argues thus: on the materialists' view, thought processes are brain processes.2 Brain processes are physical processes, and nothing can influence a physical process except another process, state or thing. Reasons are nothing physical, hence a materialist cannot consistently maintain that a man's views on materialism, or on anything else, can be affected by reasons. Glassen focuses his attention on J. J. C. Smart's claim that consideration of Occam's Razor might incline, though not compel, a philosopher to accept the 'brain process thesis'. Occam's Razor, says Glassen, is not identical with any marks on paper nor with any vocal utterances. It is not a physical state or process. Now, for a materialist, consideration must be a brain state or process, so consideration of Occam's Razor would have to be some relationship between this state or process and Occam's Razor. But because Occam's Razor is not a physical thing there could not, on physicalist principles, be any such relationship. Interestingly enough, we do not need to go much beyond Occam's own writings to see how thoroughly wrongheaded is Glassen's argument, but first a not insignificant factual correction needs to be made. The principle attributed by Glassen to Occam is 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem'. Yet no such assertion is to be found in the writings of the Venerabilis Inceptor.3 In fact, Occam insisted that God could multiply entities ad placitum.4 The thesis that Occam does put forward on several occasions is 'Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora'.5 This is a methodological principle to the effect that, faced with a number of theories that purport to explain some phenomenon, we should favour the theory