Materialism and Occam's Razor

Abstract

The argument does not show that Occam's Razor could not constitute a reason for believing a materialist account of the mind, only that it could not constitute a good reason. In other words the account of the mind that Occam's Razor is meant to support is inconsistent with the claim that Occam's Razor supports it. It is this inconsistency which precludes Occam's Razor from constituting a good reason for believing in a materialist account of the mind. There may of course be other grounds for precluding it but these are not at issue. My concern here is to show that Glassen's argument does not show that Occam's Razor cannot constitute a good reason for believing in a materialist account of the mind. I shall show that (i) is false and Glassen's argument therefore unsound. Glassen considers the suggestion that Occam's Razor is a principle but he does not think the suggestion has much promise. However the suggestion does have some plausibility and is worth exploring. What then is a principle? For a start a (methodological) principle is a constraint on rational theory construction. Occam's Razor is such a principle: it tells us what we must do if we are to construct theories in a rational way. Thus to believe Occam's Razor is to believe that theory construction should proceed in a certain way. Someone who appeals to Occam's Razor is thus appealing to a belief about which he has further beliefs. Among these is the belief that the initial belief is a rational one to hold. When Smart appeals to Occam's Razor in defending a materialist account of the mind he is appealing to a belief which he believes rational people should hold