Abstract
This paper, as to the quality control of logistics service under the port supply chain structure of two leveled logistics services, establishes the principal-agent model of port supply chain logistics service quality. The research provided here also studies the supervision decision of service quality of port enterprises under situations of symmetric and asymmetric information. Finally, the above results are compared, showing that the port enterprises should first measure the punishment size of internal and external loss penalty and then make the decision for the supervision level of service quality. The quality control of good logistics services is of great significance. This paper, from the perspective of quality benefit, studies the differences and similarities of the supervision decisions of service quality under situations of symmetric and asymmetric information for the logistic enterprises in the system of specific contract using the principal agent theory. The goal of this study is to provide some reference for the logistic enterprises to choose the proper supervision measures.
Published Version
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