The Psychology of WMD Terrorism

Abstract

The concern for superterrorism using CBRN weapons has generally focused on what terrorists can do and what our societal vulnerabilities are, with scant attention to terrorist motivations, their incentives, and constraints. In considering which in the spectrum of terrorist groups might be inclined to carry out acts of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) terrorism, it is important to differentiate the spectrum of such acts as well. Consider the following categorization: (a) large-scale casualties with conventional weapons; (b) CBRN hoaxes; (c) a conventional attack on a nuclear facility; (d) a limited-scale chemical or biological attack or radiological dispersal; (e) a large-scale chemical or biological attack or radiological dispersal; and (f) CBRN strikes (superterrorism) in which thousands of casualties may result. The crucial psychological barrier is not the choice of weapon but rather the willingness to cause mass casualties—a threshold that has already been crossed by some groups. These groups are not attempting to influence the West but to take revenge against the West. Besides the motivation or the willingness to inflict mass casualties by any means, terrorists must possess the technical and financial capabilities to obtain the materials and skills to weaponize such materials and carry out an attack. Chemical and biological weapons may pose a risk to the terrorists themselves and caution might deter them from using such weapons. The technical hurdles and lack of “know-how” can prevent even a willing terrorist from staging a mass casualty terrorist act. Given the skills and hazards in working with radiological and nuclear materials in particular, some groups might question the necessity to move into this technologically difficult and dangerous area when they could inflict mass casualties and mass terror by using conventional weapons, as was …