'The Program With Many Components Rarely Succeeds': Lessons From the First Year of Brazil’s Zero Hunger Program

Abstract

In 2003 Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) announced a nationwide Zero Hunger Program (Programa Fome Zero). Though often heralded as a model for anti-hunger policy, Zero Hunger was far from successful in its first year. President Lula’s initially created the Special Ministry for Food Security (MESA), headed by Jose Graziano, to integrate a wide range of initiatives to eliminate the “vicious cycle” of hunger. MESA’s primary policy was The Food Card, modeled after the U.S. Food Stamp, with recipients selected by newly formed Management Committees made up of volunteers at the municipal level. The Food Card saw a slow rollout, controversy over program qualifications, and opposition from mayors objecting to the role of the Management Committees in selecting beneficiaries. Within a year President Lula merged MESA’s Food Card program with three other cash transfers to form a conditional cash transfer (CCT) called Family Allowance (Bolsa Familia). He also merged MESA into the new Ministry of Social Development (MDS). This paper argues one reason program implementation initially failed in 2003 is because the design was too complex. In contrast, the combination of MESA, the Ministry of Social Assistance and Family Allowance into one ministry greatly simplified the institutional structure of anti-hunger policy. Compared to the Food Card, Family Allowance was a much simpler program, and this simplified approach deserves part of the credit for the program’s success. The paper supports this assessment with evidence from media reports, government documents, and interviews from fieldwork in Brazil (October 2010-July 2011).