The problem of the parties’ explanations as evidence in arbitration courts

Abstract

The article examines the problem of the parties explanations as evidence in arbitration courts. The author analyzes this problem through the prism of the admissibility of lies in the arbitration process. This problem is resolved from both legal and philosophical and ethical positions. The untruth is something that destroys trust the foundation of society, among other things, it undermines the credibility of the court, which accepts a lie; a lie destroys the person himself. The author reasonably believes that the one who considers a lie in court to be permissible allows the victory of untruth in court, thereby contributing to the transformation of a liar into a triumphant villain with the complicity of the court. Lying leads to dysfunction of justice, allowing lies in the trial is contrary to the very foundations of justice. The entry into force of a judgment based on a lie in one dispute only gives rise to a new dispute between the same parties. The author proves that a negative attitude towards lies is characteristic of both substantive and procedural law. It is concluded that the availability of effective means of protection against lies in the process is consistent with the principle of maintaining citizens confidence in the law and the actions of the state; justice is expected from the courts, not the encouragement of lies and deceit. The author reveals a contradiction between the attitude to judicial errors formed in the Soviet era and the consideration of the procedure of revision based on newly discovered circumstances only to the procedure of revision in the order of self-control, and the actual task of the court to correct judicial errors. It is rightly noted that this approach is extremely difficult to overcome, since new evidence showing the lie of the party is not considered by the courts as newly discovered circumstances. Meanwhile, a decision based on a lie is a miscarriage of justice.