The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant's "Refutation of Idealism": Two Recent Views

Abstract

Kant's argumentation in the of Idealism section of The Critique of Pure Reason is-to put it mildly-highly compressed. In fact, a step necessary to the completion of the Refutation appears to be missing altogether. If the self can be directly known to persist through change, the Refutation fails, yet Kant seems not to address such a possibility. This apparent omission has recently drawn the attention of scholars, including Henry Allison and Paul Guyer. Allison and Guyer both maintain that Kant had the resources to fill the seeming gap in the Refutation, although they disagree as to exactly what form the completed argument would take. The proposals made by Guyer and Allison do much to illuminate Kant's thinking, but neither, I believe, is fully successful.