The problem of selecting capabilities: Nussbaum’s philosophical road to democracy

Abstract

Abstract: Capability Approach theorists have placed the recognition of capabilities and functionings at the core of their theories. However, they disagree about the selection of relevant capabilities. In this article, I argue that contrary to what the author claims, it is not philosophically possible to derive a list of central capabilities in this way, from the concept of human dignity underlying Martha Nussbaum’s theory. From that concept it is only possible to derive a process of democratic decision, in which everybody is represented fairly and equally. It should be noted that the proposal presented in this article is not in opposition to Nussbaum’s theory, but rather an attempt to offer a new interpretation of it, based on the normative groundings of theory, in order to address some of its theoretical problems. This thesis occupies forth section. In the second and third sections, I summarize the debate around the problem of selecting capabilities.