The primacy of foreign policy: An evaluation of the role of public opinion during the July crisis 1914

Abstract

Some recent scholarship has suggested that the decisions which led to war in 1914 were determined by domestic considerations. The present article examines and evaluates the contending interpretations of this influence, influence being defined as the statesmen's perceptions of public opinion's effect on their decisions during the crisis. It is suggested that there are six basic approaches which are designated as propellant‐deterrent, plot, cipher, manipulation, instrument and consensus. Under the heading of propellant‐deterrent are included views of public opinion as influential either in encouraging (piopellant) or restraining (deterrent) decisions for war. Plot theses argue that conservative leaders resorted to war in order to avoid revolution. The cipher theory views opinion as a non‐factor in decision makers’ calculations. Manipulation theories suggest that statesmen saw opinion as a potential obstacle which had to be removed and as a necessary ingredient in the conduct of modern war. Under the rubric of instrument are interpretations of governments as exploiting opinion as a diplomatic tool. Consensus theories view decision makers as aware of public opinion's importance but assuming agreement with it. While evidence can be produced to support all these positions, least exists for the first two and most for the last four which combine to offer the most persuasive analysis of opinion's role during the crisis. The article concludes that domestic considerations may have affected the timing and form but not the essence of fore'gn policy both during the July crisis and international crises in general.