Abstract

According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on balance better off if it had not occurred. This view faces the “preemption problem.” In the recent literature, there are various ingenious attempts to deal with this problem, some of which involve slight additions to, or modifications of, the counterfactual comparative account. We argue, however, that none of these attempts work, and that the preemption problem continues to haunt the counterfactual comparative account.

Highlights

  • The debate on harm is dominated by the counterfactual comparative account, the most straightforward version of which can be formulated as follows: CCA An event e is overall harmful for S if and only if S would have been on balance better off if e had not occurred CCA has many virtues beyond the obvious ones of elegance and simplicity

  • The preemption problem continues to haunt the counterfactual comparative account of harm; as we briefly indicate in our concluding remarks (Sect. 5), there may be reason to give alternative theories another chance

  • Because Boonin’s discussion of the preemption problem occurs in the context of the ‘‘non-identity problem,’’ which concerns the moral status of certain procreative actions, he focuses on cases where the pertinent event is an action

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Summary

Introduction

The debate on harm is dominated by the counterfactual comparative account, the most straightforward version of which can be formulated as follows: CCA An event e is overall harmful for S if and only if S would have been on balance better off if e had not occurred CCA has many virtues beyond the obvious ones of elegance and simplicity. According to Bradley, while Batman fails to benefit Robin, this does not constitute harming him. Contrary to what Bradley suggests, CCA does not imply that Batman’s mere failure to benefit Robin constitutes harming him. Feit and Hanna argue, if the decision really does have the required feature, it is after all defensible to say that it harms Robin ( Feit concedes that the problem still constitutes ‘‘a strike’’ against CCA (Feit 2015: 385)).. Feit and Hanna argue, if the decision really does have the required feature, it is after all defensible to say that it harms Robin ( Feit concedes that the problem still constitutes ‘‘a strike’’ against CCA (Feit 2015: 385)).1 The preemption problem continues to haunt the counterfactual comparative account of harm; as we briefly indicate in our concluding remarks (Sect. 5), there may be reason to give alternative theories another chance

Unnecessary evils
Plural harm
Fundamental intentions
Concluding remarks

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