Abstract
Abstract This chapter focuses on the plural harm approach, that is, the counterfactual comparative account of harm (CCA) extended to include plural harm, as it relates to several issues concerning the metaphysics and moral relevance of harm. It begins by considering a recent challenge to the counterfactual comparative account that is similar in some respects to the problem of preemption. It argues that the plural harm approach lets advocates of CCA respond plausibly to the objection. The chapter also contains responses to some objections that focus on the plural harm approach itself and, in its final section, it contains a response to a challenge that concerns the moral status of actions performed in cases of preemption, where the acts are intuitively impermissible but harmless according to the account.
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