The Power and Weakness of the Sultan’s Army in the Description of the Allies of the Second Anti-French Coalition (the Asian Stage of the Campaign of 1799—1801)

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The article is devoted to a little-studied event of the Napoleonic Wars: the Ottoman campaign of 1799—1801 against the French expeditionary force that captured Egypt. The events of this campaign are revealed in documents, some of which have not yet been published, and some written in Arabic and Ottoman languages are poorly introduced into scientific circulation. Of particular interest is the fact that the most informative source covering the Asian part of the campaign was Enrico Frankini, the Russian agent in the army of the Grand Vizier. Comparing the views of European and Ottoman campaign participants on the system of organization and management of the Sultan’s army, the relationship between the central and provincial authorities, the Ottomans and the Arabic-speaking population, the self-identification of Muslim soldiers and their attitude to “infidel” enemies or allies — all this allows us to better understand the mutual perception of Europeans preparing for colonial conquests in the Middle East, and the Ottoman society, which was on the verge of transformation. Realizing the need for modernization, Sultan Selim III (1789—1807) began to organize the regiments of the “new order”, but the military reform, as well as several other transformations, caused a sharp rejection of the traditional Ottoman elites. Involvement in the Napoleonic Wars, first as part of the anti-French coalition, and then on the side of France, had fatal consequences both for Selim III himself and for his reforms. A significant role in assessing the low combat capability of the Sultan’s army was played by the reports of Russian and British informants who participated in the Ottoman campaign in Egypt.