The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue Epistemology

Abstract

Virtue epistemologists argue for the centrality of our cognitive virtues⎯our epistemic powers⎯to epistemological theorising. As we explain, this approach has tremendous potential for casting light on a number of important questions within epistemology. It is also argued, however, that there is an essential limitation to such an approach⎯one that we suggest virtue epistemologists should be willing to embrace⎯in that virtue epistemology cannot by itself offer a compelling account of knowledge. 1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS One of the most influential proposals in epistemology in recent years has been virtue epistemology. Although there is a wide range of views which could plausibly be regarded as falling under this general heading, what they have in common is the idea that epistemology needs to make central appeal to the notion of epistemic virtues (and, of course, vices). In particular, virtue epistemologists hold that epistemic virtue plays a fundamental explanatory role, such that we should understand other epistemic standings in terms of the manifestation of epistemic virtue. So, for example, a virtue epistemologist would be inclined to explain a subject’s positive epistemic justification in terms of her manifestation of epistemic virtue, rather than explaining it in terms which make no reference to epistemic virtue (such as by appealing to the available supporting evidence). Relatedly, a virtue epistemologist would be