From Virtue Ethics to Virtue Epistemology

Abstract

This chapter presents the argument that there is room for a third analysis of epistemic virtues and vices-personalism, which has been largely unexplored in virtue epistemology. Personalism contends that epistemic virtues and vices must be personal, rather than sub-personal, qualities. It contends that epistemic virtues and vices must be personal qualities. Operation-personalism is likely to appeal to free will skeptics. Possession-personalism has been overlooked in the literature on virtue epistemology due, perhaps, to the widespread influence of Linda Zagzebski's version of responsibilism. The chapter addresses the potential benefits of a pluralist virtue epistemology that makes space for personalism. In short, according to virtue-reliabilism, one can have epistemic virtues and vices for whose possession and operation peoples are not responsible. In contrast, virtue-responsibilists, like Linda Zagzebski and James Montmarquet, offer a more restrictive analysis of an epistemic virtue. They argue that epistemic virtues must be character traits-like open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual humility.