The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism

Abstract

INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY and the attitudes of her leaders seem more than ever to pose a threat to hopes for peaceful change and development in Southeast Asia. While disturbing aspects of Indonesia's policies have been apparent for several years, a fresh appraisal is warranted now by Indonesia's confrontation policy toward Malaya and Malaysia, and President Sukarno's refusal to accept U Thant's determination that the establishment of Malaysia is supported by its resident peoples. These are merely the most recent surface manifestations of a deeper problem. The source of the threat lies largely in what appears to be a continuing expansionist sentiment among Indonesian leaders. This sentiment is further supported by certain elements of Indonesia's political ideology. The basis of the problem is not essentially concerned with communism, although Western discussion of Indonesian policy, more than that of any other non-aligned nation, tends to concentrate too heavily on matters related to the Sino-Soviet bloc. Soviet military assistance, for example, has been a favorite subject of attention, along with the size and role of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its many front groups. Most recently, the intriguing and perhaps vital question of the PKI's orientation within the Sino-Soviet dispute has also been well explored. Nothing that will be said here is intended to deny the need for more knowledge on these and related problems; nor will it be argued that the attention to Communist efforts in Indonesia is unwarranted, since Indonesia has received more and better military aid from the Soviet Union than has any other nation.1 Similarly, it is of unquestionable importance that, with a membership of between two and three millions, the Indonesian Communist Party is the world's third largest-ranking behind only the Chinese and parties. Moreover, the PKI's affiliates in labor unions and other fields probably add another ten or eleven million Indonesians to its list of active supporters. And finally, the increasing participation of the major Communist leaders in President Sukarno's non-Communist government illustrates clearly a central point in the Sino-Soviet debate: the Indonesian party has tended to act Russian while talking Chinese. The behavior of the PKI, and the dilemmas imposed upon it by its role and environment, will continue to attract the