The Possibility of an Evolutionary Semantics

Abstract

The possibility of an evolutionary semantics rests on at least three interrelated shifts in typical philosophical practice and belief: a de-privileging of human language; a recognition of iconic spatio-kinetic corporeal representation as a fundamental form of meaning in the animate world; a recognition of modes ofsymbolization in everyday life that are pre-reflective. Typical philosophical belief and practice are exemplified by Jonathan Bennett in his book, Rationality,1 wherein human language is taken as the standard by which the intelligence ofbees is measured; by Daniel Dennett in his intentional systems theory approach to nonhuman animal behavior which, through its exclusive focus on cognitive competence in the form of beliefs, desires, and so on, overlooks corporeal intentionality and in so doing overlooks the built-in semanticity of being a body;2 by Donald Davidson in his claim that short of language, creatures cannot have beliefs, desires, and other similar kinds ofpsychological capacities.3 This paper will present compelling, if necessarily abbreviated, evidence for revising typical philosophical views and adopting an evolutionary semantics perspective. I