Précis of Hume's True Scepticism

Abstract

Précis of Hume's True Scepticism Donald C. Ainslie (bio) In Hume's True Scepticism (hereafter "HTS"), I offer a new interpretation of David Hume's epistemology and philosophy of mind as presented in A Treatise of Human Nature.1 I approach this task by developing what I take to be the first comprehensive2 investigation of Part 4 of Book 1. The arguments Hume offers there have frequently been addressed by the secondary literature in a piecemeal fashion, especially his account of personal identity and of our belief in the external world. But I argue in HTS that they should be read as a sustained investigation of the human temptation to form philosophical systems. Consider its title: "Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy" (emphasis added). Hume, I suggest, is interested both in defending his own preferred approach to what he calls the "science of human nature" (T Intro. 9, 1.1.1.12, 1.2.5.19, 1.3.8.2; SBN xviii, 7, 60, 98), and explaining how the mind's structures lead other philosophers to succumb to certain characteristic errors. The outcome is a "true" scepticism (T 1.4.7.14; SBN 273) in which we acknowledge that philosophical beliefs about the mind are not fundamentally different in kind from vulgar beliefs about the world: both depend on the associative tendencies built in to human nature and thus, do not equip us to penetrate into how things are independently of our cognitive capacities—their "real nature and operations" (T 1.2.5.25–26; SBN 63–64). It follows that there is no "obligation" to philosophize (T 1.4.7.10; SBN 270), and it is domesticated into an activity that should be pursued only by those with an inclination for it (T 1.4.7.12; SBN 270–71). A central theme in HTS is the role of reflection in philosophy and in everyday life. I suggest that Hume holds that in everyday life, the "vulgar"—all of us most of the time (T 1.4.2.36; SBN 205)—are fully engaged by our reasoning and sensing. Thus, we are not normally aware of the mental mechanisms that Hume details throughout the Treatise, nor are we even aware of the perceptions that he takes to be the vehicles for our mental lives. Rather, we typically [End Page 95] remain focused solely on that which our reasonings and sensings concern. In calculating a tip at a restaurant, for example, our thoughts concern only the bill. In going about our business in the world, we take ourselves to be moving in the same world of tables and chairs and trees as everyone else. In chapter 2, I argue that even this 'taking' is something we are not normally aware of. Instead, we carry along a mostly unarticulated and unrecognized assumption that we are in touch with the world. I spend a fair amount of time in chapters 2 and 3 showing how Hume understands the mind to produce this assumption. I argue that a proper interpretation of the relevant material (especially T 1.2 and 1.4.2) requires that we see his empiricist theory of representation as being much more flexible than it is often taken to be, where the so-called copy principle—the requirement that every simple idea be derived from a prior simple impression—is treated dogmatically, as if Hume himself does not immediately qualify it, first, with the "missing shade of blue" (T 1.1.1.10; SBN 5–6), and shortly thereafter with his account of general ideas (T 1.1.7; SBN 17–25). In the latter, Hume argues that we are able to think of universals, despite never having impressions of them, because the imagination associates ideas of particular members of the kind in an appropriately structured manner when accompanied by a linguistic token. I take the linguistic dimension of Hume's account to be especially significant, in that it brings in a normative and social dimension (T 3.2.2.10; SBN 490) to his otherwise narrowly naturalistic and individualistic treatment of the mind. I argue that, for Hume, this set of associative and linguistic...