The Portuguese Revolution of 1974—75 and U.S. Foreign Policy

Abstract

Oldberg, I. The Portuguese Revolution of 1974-75 and U.S. Foreign Policy. Coop eration and Conflict, XVII, 1982, 179-189 The article analyzes American reaction to the development in Portugal from April 1974 to November 1975. It is shown that the Administration took an alarmist view, that it was pessimistic concerning prospects for democracy, and that it was prone toward taking repressive measures, whereas other political actors at home and abroad exercised a restraining influence. Internationally, the Portuguese events gave rise to a new domino theory which was used to discourage West Europeans from going soft on Communism. The doctrinaire Moscow-orientated Portuguese Communists helped form the American attitude toward the Euro-Communists. In relation to the Soviet Union, the Americans used the detente process, culminating in the CSCE Conference in Helsinki in July 1975, as a means toward restricting Soviet aid to the Portuguese Communists. This seems to have worked, thus making American intervention less urgent. But the Portuguese Revolution paved the way for revolutionary regimes in Portugal's African colonies, which the Soviets and their allies could assist. This dealt the first serious blow to the American interest in detente with the Soviet Union.