The politics of migration interdependence in the post-Arab Spring Middle East

Abstract

Political economy dynamics allow unique insights into regional migration governance. Within the Middle East migration sub-system, how do states attempt to use their position as destinations for labour migration to influence sending states, and when do they succeed? I argue that economically-driven cross-border mobility generates reciprocal political economy effects, or migration interdependence. Host states may leverage their position against a sending state by either deploying strategies of restriction or displacement. These strategies’ success depends on whether the sending state is vulnerable to the political-economy costs incurred due to the host states’ strategy and whether it cannot procure the support of alternative host states. I demonstrate my claims through a least-likely, two-case study design of Libyan and Jordanian coercive migration diplomacy against Egypt. By focusing on the politics of regional migration governance in the Middle East, I examine how two weaker Arab states successfully leveraged their position against a stronger one.