Labor Migrants as Political Leverage: Migration Interdependence and Coercion in the Mediterranean

Gerasimos Tsourapas

doi:10.1093/isq/sqx088

Abstract

How do states attempt to use their position as destinations for labor migration to influence sending states, and under what conditions do they succeed? I argue that economically driven cross-border mobility generates reciprocal political economy effects on sending and host states. That is, it produces migration interdependence. Host states may leverage their position against a sending state by either deploying strategies of restriction—curbing remittances, strengthening immigration controls, or both—or displacement—forcefully expelling citizens of the sending state. These strategies’ success depends on whether the sending state is vulnerable to the political economy costs incurred by host states’ strategy, namely if it is unable to absorb them domestically and cannot procure the support of alternative host states. I also contend that displacement strategies involve higher costs than restriction efforts and are therefore more likely to succeed. I demonstrate my claims through a least-likely, two-case study design of Libyan and Jordanian coercive migration diplomacy against Egypt in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. I examine how two weaker Arab states leveraged their position against Egypt, a stronger state but one vulnerable to migration interdependence, through the restriction and displacement of Egyptian migrants.

Highlights

“The number of people makes the wealth of states.” Frederick the Great “It’s an easy decision for Mexico,” wrote Donald Trump in his March 2016 memo to the Washington Post
This article aims to expand our understanding of the interplay between migration and power politics by examining how labor migration features in coercive interstate relations
The effectiveness of restriction or displacement depends on whether a sending state is vulnerable to migration interdependence

Summary

Introduction

“The number of people makes the wealth of states.” Frederick the Great “It’s an easy decision for Mexico,” wrote Donald Trump in his March 2016 memo to the Washington Post. Trump detailed how he intended to force Mexico to finance a border wall between the United States and its southern neighbor He would threaten to cut off its migrants’ remittances. European citizens in Great Britain accuse the Gerasimos Tsourapas is a lecturer in Middle East politics at the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham He works on authoritarianism and the politics of migration, refugees, and diasporas in the Middle East and North Africa. This article aims to expand our understanding of the interplay between migration and power politics by examining how labor migration features in coercive interstate relations It addresses two main questions: How do states attempt to leverage their position as destinations for labor migration to influence sending states? It addresses two main questions: How do states attempt to leverage their position as destinations for labor migration to influence sending states? Under which conditions do these attempts succeed?

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