The Politics of Defense Budgeting: A Study of Organisation and Resource Allocation in the United Kingdom and the United States

Abstract

Abstract : World War II exposed weaknesses in the management of defense resources, leading the United Kingdom in 1946 and the United States in 1947 to centralize their defense organizations. Although each organization has evolved differently, both share the problem of interservice rivalry over resource allocation to competing service missions and weapons systems. Michael Hobkirk, a Ministry of Defense Under Secretary, now retired, argues that this intramural rivalry obstructs coherent defense planning. His examination of the bureaucratic politics of resource allocation in the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Defense points up the strengths and weaknesses of both structures. Combining the best features of each system, he proposes a hypothetical, 'ideal' defense organization. Such an organization would include a powerful central staff; a planning, programming, budgeting system with functional categories for specific service tasks; a long-term budget system for future planning; and--most important--a permanent cadre of civilian staff at the highest level. In an era of ever more constrained resources and changing strategic requirements, the need for maximum benefit from resources expended remains self-evident. This study should help defense planners, students of organizational theory, and those who would better understand the defense policies of our allies.