The Political Logic of Status Competition: Leaders, Status Tradeoffs, and Beijing’s Vietnam Policy, 1949–1965

Abstract

Abstract Students of status politics among nations could hardly evade two broad questions: how do status aspirations drive state foreign policy? And when do leaders consider international conflict a vehicle for status assertion? Conventional wisdom holds that humiliating international events could sensitize leaders to great-power status, increase their propensity for geopolitical competition, and fuel domestic agitation for provocative policies abroad. This assertion is empirically and theoretically flawed. In response, my argument underscores the fact that leaders often have to reconcile their status claims with the imperatives of national security and political survival. Two hypotheses follow. First, in the aftermath of humiliating international events, leaders tend to abstain from provocative policies. That is because such policies risk escalation of conflicts abroad which could jeopardize leaders’ interests in national security and domestic political survival. However, should the moderate approach either encourage the rival power to threaten leaders’ ties with a client state or stir a domestic backlash, leaders may pursue a provocative policy (a second hypothesis). Beijing’s Vietnam policy in 1949–1965 provides crucial evidence for these hypotheses, which carry implications for theory and current events.