Abstract
Any theory of policy evaluation has to address the problem of the choice of criteria for decision making. In most theories of policy rationality, derived from economic theories of the utility-maximizing individual and a positivist conception of valuation, such values are to be regarded as the “preferences” of the policy maker. The stipulation and ordering of standards of judgment is not considered to be part of policy rationality itself. This conception of rationality is not obligatory. Understanding rationality as having good reasons for an action, and policy judgment as a process of argument, enables us to stipulate certain standards at the metapolitical level which any system of policy evaluation must meet. It is possible to identify a logical sense in which such classic principles as authority, justice and efficiency can be understood as necessary considerations in any rationally defensible policy appraisal.
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