The Philosophy of Forgiveness

Abstract

Abstract This chapter maps out the history of the philosophy of forgiveness and considers whether contemporary philosophers can provide us with an adequate definition. How is forgiving related to various other ways of responding to wrongdoing, including resenting, blaming, rebuking, punishing, pardoning, excusing, and forgetting? While some contemporary philosophers refer back to Bishop Butler’s comments on forgiveness, philosophical work on interpersonal forgiveness did not begin in earnest until the second half of the twentieth century, when several influential papers set the parameters for the current debate and helped to solidify some common assumptions about the nature of forgiveness. There is a lot of disagreement on this issue, but this chapter focuses on the common ground. The vast majority of contemporary philosophers who write about this topic agree that forgiving is a response to wrongdoing that is incompatible with excusing and with justifying, and, in slightly different way, incompatible with forgetting. Most philosophers think that forgiveness is connected in some way to blame and the reactive attitude of resentment. Furthermore, contemporary philosophers agree that forgiving is distinct from but compatible with institutional pardoning and acts of mercy.