A Philosophical Mess

Abstract

Abstract This chapter provides a systematic survey of the many disagreements amongst contemporary philosophers about the nature of forgiveness. Is forgiveness an emotional change, or a decision, or a commitment, or a performative speech act, or a behavioural change, or a stable end state? Is forgiveness always done for a particular kind of reason? Which negative emotions, attitudes, or behaviours are counteracted by forgiveness? Is forgiving compatible with blaming, or with punishing, or with refusing to reconcile with the wrongdoer? Do only direct victims of wrongdoing have the standing to forgive, or are third-party forgiveness and self-forgiveness also possible? Is forgiveness targeted only at wrong actions, or also at other moral failures? Is forgiving an elective gift? Is forgiving compatible with condoning? Philosophers give conflicting answers to all these questions, leaving it unclear as to how we could identify real forgiveness.