Abstract

Introduction After five years of emergency rule in the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos once again referred the need for the country return a situation of normalcy. This expression of confidence perhaps reflects that all is well in the country. During the year, the government had continued manage its economic affairs despite the difficulties of the world economy as a whole. It had also temporarily contained, if not crippled, the communist threat. The most serious opposition the government came from the militant Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), after the ceasefire agreed in December 1976, broke down sometime in the middle of the year. It was, in any case, a situation where too much was expected of a conflict that had gone on intermittently for the last 400 years. In the field of foreign policy, the government appeared have consolidated the new departures that the country had made since 1972. Only one inconstant and aberrating influence made its appearance during the year and seemed have made some impact. This concerned the moral American approach its dealings with the Philippines. Like many other ex-colonial states that won their independence since World War II, the Philippines' experiment in constitutional democracy fell victim its own political excesses. Invoking his constitutional right as Chief Executive of the nation (Article VII, Section 10, paragraph 2), President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1081 on 22 September 1972 to save the Republic and reform our society. At the time many observers viewed with regret this rather abrupt end what was once regarded as one of the most democratic countries in the world. One of the most controversial issues that was raised by the President's action involved the nature and the form of the new Philippine polity. The President took great pains point out that the declaration of martial law did not constitute either a military takeover of the functions of the government or an end Philippine democracy. At the same time, the President's action raised yet another doubt in the minds of many leaders in the developing world of the efficacy of democratic institutions, particularly the transplantability of western ideas and institutions in non-Western developing countries. The President argued that democratic institutions ought be modified suit local conditions if they were remain viable in the long run. The institution of martial law was seen as a temporary expedient being employed reform Philippine society and institute new ideas and forms. The continued survival of the martial law government depends upon its ability initiate changes in the and economic life of the country. Politically, the government promised restructure the nation's institutions, as threats its existence, both of a military and nonmilitary nature, were ever present. In the economic area, the President has staked his reputation on the success, particularly, of his government's land reform policies.

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